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Collaborative functionality is changing the way information is amassed, refined, and disseminated in online
environments. A subclass of these systems characterized by "open collaboration" uniquely allow participants to
*modify* content with low barriers-to-entry. A prominent example and our case study, English Wikipedia,
exemplifies the vulnerabilities: 7%+ of its edits are blatantly unconstructive. Our measurement studies show
this damage manifests in novel socio-technical forms, limiting the effectiveness of computational detection
strategies from related domains. In turn this has made much mitigation the responsibility of a poorly
organized and ill-routed human workforce. We aim to improve all facets of this incident response workflow.
Complementing language based solutions we first develop content agnostic predictors of damage. We
implicitly glean reputations for system entities and overcome sparse behavioral histories with a spatial
reputation model combining evidence from multiple granularity. We also identify simple yet indicative
metadata features that capture participatory dynamics and content maturation. When brought to bear over
damage corpora our contributions: (1) advance benchmarks over a broad set of security issues ("vandalism"),
(2) perform well in the first anti-spam specific approach, and (3) demonstrate their portability over diverse
open collaboration use cases.
Probabilities generated by our classifiers can also intelligently route human assets using prioritization schemes
optimized for capture rate or impact minimization. Organizational primitives are introduced that improve
workforce efficiency. The whole of these strategies are then implemented into a tool ("STiki") that has been
used to revert 350,000+ damaging instances from Wikipedia. These uses are analyzed to learn about human
aspects of the edit review process, properties including scalability, motivation, and latency. Finally, we
conclude by measuring practical impacts of work, discussing how to better integrate our solutions, and
revealing outstanding vulnerabilities that speak to research challenges for open collaboration security.
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ABSTRACT
DAMAGE DETECTION AND MITIGATION
IN OPEN COLLABORATION APPLICATIONS
Andrew G. West
Insup Lee
Oleg Sokolsky
Collaborative functionality is changing the way information is amassed, refined, and
disseminated in online environments. A subclass of these systems characterized by
“open collaboration” uniquely allow participants to modify content with low barriers-
to-entry. A prominent example and our case study, English Wikipedia, exemplifies
the vulnerabilities: 7%+ of its edits are blatantly unconstructive. Our measurement
studies show this damage manifests in novel socio-technical forms, limiting the effec-
tiveness of computational detection strategies from related domains. In turn this has
made much mitigation the responsibility of a poorly organized and ill-routed human
workforce. We aim to improve all facets of this incident response workflow.
Complementing language based solutions we first develop content agnostic pre-
dictors of damage. We implicitly glean reputations for system entities and overcome
sparse behavioral histories with a spatial reputation model combining evidence from
multiple granularity. We also identify simple yet indicative metadata features that
capture participatory dynamics and content maturation. When brought to bear over
damage corpora our contributions: (1) advance benchmarks over a broad set of secu-
rity issues (“vandalism”), (2) perform well in the first anti-spam specific approach,
and (3) demonstrate their portability over diverse open collaboration use cases.
Probabilities generated by our classifiers can also intelligently route human assets
using prioritization schemes optimized for capture rate or impact minimization. Or-
ganizational primitives are introduced that improve workforce efficiency. The whole
of these strategies are implemented into a tool (“STiki”) that has been used to re-
vert 350,000+ damaging instances from Wikipedia. These uses are analyzed to learn
about human aspects of the edit review process; properties including scalability, mo-
tivation, and latency. Finally, we conclude by measuring practical impacts of our
work, discussing how to better integrate our solutions, and revealing outstanding
vulnerabilities that speak to research challenges for open collaboration security.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Collaborative, user generated, and crowdsourced functionalities are becoming in-
creasingly prevalent in Web applications. One finds these capabilities in blog/article
commenting systems, social networks, web forums, question/answer services, and
centralized content hosts. The ability of ordinary users to contribute knowledge,
opinions, and other content has allowed sites to aggregate massive amounts of data
at minimal marginal cost. One can distinguish among these applications based on
their accessibility, i.e., the barriers-to-entry they present, and the permission set
they extend to participants. While many environments spur participation by being
accessible most are also “append only” in nature, only allowing users to contribute
to monotonically growing discussions or repositories.
Remarkable in this space are “open collaboration” applications [57] that are ac-
cessible while allowing users to freely modify the content of others. The prototypical
example of open collaboration is the online encyclopedia Wikipedia [14], our case
study in analyzing the vulnerabilities these types of environments face. In this disser-
tation (and briefly in this introduction) we argue that open collaboration applications
redefine how security abuses can manifest and be mitigated (Sec. 1.1), spurring novel
computational and human-driven mechanisms to mitigate their ill-effects (Sec. 1.2).
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In the course of exploring this hypothesis and developing practical defense mecha-
nisms we make significant contributions towards the security of Wikipedia and the
entire open collaboration paradigm (Sec. 1.3).
1.1 Novel Security Considerations
Our case study, Wikipedia, well represents the security challenges that face open
collaboration. Well-publicized inaccuracies have proven detrimental to Wikipedia’s
public image [107, 119], but these only hint at the larger fact that 7-10% of Wikipedia
edits are blatantly unconstructive [110]. Some 400,000 abusive edits each month oc-
cur on Wikipedia’s English edition alone [22], and as the 6th most trafficked Internet
site [2] there are a tremendous number of end users to consume this damage. These
are problems of significant scale that manifest in varied ways. In the aggregate such
behavior is termed vandalism, a set predominately characterized by offensive speech,
narcissistic behavior, and unjustified deletions. At times we will concentrate on the
link spam subset when focus is needed on more acute, subtle, and presumably sophis-
ticated attack vectors. In extreme examples contributions can even incur liability
for the host site or be a privacy threat to individuals.
The fact these abusive behaviors occur is unsurprising. Wikipedia has virtually
no barriers-to-entry and allows anyone to participate. Given such behaviors the ob-
jective is to mitigate the damage as accurately and efficiently as possible. When this
does not occur there are negative consequences for the host site (e.g., Wikipedia), its
participants, and the collaborative paradigm on the whole. Consider that: (1) When
damage is public facing it can erode confidence in the site’s information accuracy,
(2) if damage must be manually located, this wastes participant time, (3) detection
latency is proportional to the utility its perpetrators might derive, and (4) percep-
tions of a site’s viability might affect participant retention and recruitment. These are
not effects to which Wikipedia is immune. Authors describe bureaucratic policy [38],
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increasing traffic [22], and a declining labor force [63] that threaten Wikipedia’s secu-
rity scalability. While Goldman [63] contends that barriers-to-entry will need to be
heightened moving forward, we argue that increasingly accurate and efficient security
functionality is a realistic and preferable alternative.
Existing work suggests two complementary approaches: (1) using computational
methods to autonomously detect and undo damage, and (2) increasing the efficiency
of the human actors who are responsible for the remainder of the problem space.
Operating with no latency and zero marginal cost, anti-vandalism classifiers have
been an area of research emphasis. A majority of these lie in the natural language
processing (NLP) domain: using lexical, syntactic, and semantic methods to identify
token patterns that are indicative of damaging behavior. Others have attempted to
compute simple reputations for authors. Despite being the state-of-the-art, these
techniques can autonomously mitigate less than half of vandalism instances at tol-
erable false positive rates. This places a significant burden on human participants
who only have simple tools at their disposal to expedite the edit review process.
We demonstrate the challenges that underlie the detection/mitigation task by
conducting a series of measurement studies that characterize damage and highlight
the shortcomings of existing approaches. These reveal that modification semantics
are central to the problem’s difficulty. Socially, editing in a shared space broadens
those behaviors that are considered damaging. Technically, small edit payloads yield
little data for methods to analyze. Reputation methods are hampered by sparse
participation histories. Similar challenges pervade acute subsets of vandalism (e.g.,
link spam) that have no wiki-specific work from which to draw. Low barriers to
entry also enable attackers exhibiting diverse and sometimes ambiguous intentions.
Human mitigation is also influenced by the modification permission, which en-
ables ordinary participants to fulfill security roles. This gives rise to a complex dis-
tributed mitigation ecosystem, one currently characterized by disorganization and
brute force. Platforms provide insufficient primitives to facilitate the task, and as a
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result, some edits are redundantly reviewed while other damage goes undiscovered.
Recognizing these challenges our approach intends to improve both automated and
human-driven mechanisms.
1.2 Improving Mitigation
Given that computational methods are more efficient than human mitigation our ap-
proach begins by improving the coverage of autonomous classifiers. Complementing
the NLP methods of related work we contribute reputation and metadata features
that quantify aspects external to the content payload.
Reputation is the notion that prior behavior is indicative of future action, one
achieved by aggregating past behavioral observations [84]. Previous attempts on
Wikipedia [27, 29] suffered due to sparse participation histories, a problem exac-
erbated in OCA environments and broadly termed the “cold start problem”. To
counter this we utilize the principle of homophily [96] to assess entities based on
their spatial adjacency to previously observed ones [138]. For example, if little is
known about an editor, the behavior of prior participants in the same IP range can
provide considerable predictive intelligence. We describe a generic model that ele-
gantly computes reputation by combining evidence from varying spatial granularity.
In addition to applying this technique over users we are novel in associating reputa-
tions to system artifacts (and their spatial categorizations) on the presumption that
certain topics tend to attract more damaging behavior.
In a similar fashion we use metadata features to boost classifier performance.
Motivated by the effective use of a small set of spatio-temporal metadata features
against email spam [75] we sought to identify parallels in the OCA domain. In to-
tal we identify 25+ metadata features that capture participatory dynamics, content
evolution, and spatio-temporal properties. Many of these are generic to open collab-
oration use cases, not tied to Wikipedia’s idiosyncrasies or encyclopedic content.
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Both reputation and metadata features are evaluated against a vandalism corpus
using machine learning techniques. When combined with existing NLP approaches,
the resulting classifier significantly advances anti-vandalism benchmarks. Extend-
ing the reputation/metadata notions into the URL space we also assemble the first
anti-spam classifier for wiki environments. Demonstrating the portability of our con-
tent agnostic feature set we describe its application in copyright violation detection,
foreign language Wikipedias, and collaborative code repositories.
Regardless the application, computational methods tend to be easily evaluated
using standard information recall metrics over offline corpora. In shifting focus to
human mitigation we define more dynamic notions such as damage longevity and
incident exposure. In developing a strategy to minimize these impacts we describe
organizational primitives such as prioritization queues, locks for edit review, and the
explicit annotation of innocent edits. These aim to eliminate the redundancy and
inefficiencies found in our measurement studies while incorporating computational
methods to intelligently route a resource constrained workforce. We integrate these
notions into a software tool, “STiki” [136], that English Wikipedia users have utilized
to locate and expedite the removal of 350,000+ damaging contributions.
Apart from this tremendous direct impact, the tool’s 1.1+ million classification
actions are a means to study the manual inspection/mitigation process. We use
this data set to reason about the latency, motivations, and scalability of the vol-
unteer workforce. We find that selfish competition and high user turnover are not
uncommon. While we combat these with strategies to improve user bandwidth and
retention, the underlying trend further reinforces the need to limit dependency on
human security actors and to better scale available assets.
5
1.3 Contributions
This dissertation makes both practical and theoretical progress towards security for
open collaboration applications. Practically our work has focused on Wikipedia,
facilitating nearly half-a-million damage reverts and helping to maintain low inci-
dent longevity and impact measures in the face of exponentially growing traffic. It
has also sought to extend these benefits to the entire open collaboration paradigm
through greater understanding of modification semantics, participatory dynamics,
and distributed mitigation. We hope to enable not just the survival of sites like
Wikipedia but permit open collaboration to expand into increasingly sensitive and
resource constrained use cases.
To restate and establish our organization moving forward: Open collaboration
applications (Chap. 2) redefine how security abuses can manifest and be mitigated.
Existing work (Chap. 3) proves insufficient (Chap. 4), spurring novel computational
(Chap. 5) and human-driven (Chap. 6) mechanisms. Our findings spur discus-
sion about our practical impacts, security tradeoffs, and outstanding vulnerabilities
(Chap. 7). Finally, concluding remarks are made (Chap. 8). Towards proving this
hypothesis and accommodating its consequences this writing makes 5 contributions:
1. Through a series of measurement studies we characterize damaging contri-
butions in open collaboration applications. We find the social and technical
semantics of modifying content differ from those seen in comparable domains.
These give rise to novel dimensions for damage to manifest, rendering related
work insufficient at the detection task.
2. A model is developed for the spatial overlay of entity granularity reputation
algorithms. This leverages the sociological notion of “homophily” and elegantly
combines evidence from multiple spatial granularity/contexts. We demonstrate
its ability to produce predictive values in spite of sparse behavioral histories
(the “cold start problem”) by applying it over collaborative users and artifacts.
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3. Metadata features are identified that indicate damaging behavior by quanti-
fying participatory dynamics and spatio-temporal properties. We utilize these
alongside reputation features to effectively augment computational predictors
of contribution quality. The portability of this content agnostic approach is
confirmed via application in diverse use cases.
4. Complementing autonomous mechanisms, the notions of damage longevity
and incident exposure are defined and leveraged to intelligently route a dis-
tributed workforce of security enabled participants. Further improving the
defense ecosystem we develop organizational primitives not provided by the
base platform that coordinate actors and eliminate redundant work.
5. Practically implementing our suggestions of contribution #4, we create a tool
that has enormous direct impact by reverting nearly half-a-million damaging
contributions on English Wikipedia. Passively, the tool is a feedback mecha-
nism to learn about human patrol behaviors, latency, and intrinsic motivation.
This data permits reasoning about defense scalability and strategies to improve
human participation and throughput.
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Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter preliminaries are established for the remainder of the work. We
begin by defining “open collaboration” applications (OCAs) and constraining this
definition to refine the scope of this document (Sec. 2.1). Attention then turns to
OCA capable platforms and the practical use cases they enable, with wikis and
Wikipedia featuring prominently (Sec. 2.2). We then standardize the terminology
for discussing these environments (Sec. 2.3) before making simplifying assumptions
about OCA operation and the threat model (Sec. 2.4).
2.1 Open Collaboration
Crucial to this dissertation is the existence of accessible online communities that
permit participants to modify others’ content. While simply stated, Suber [126]
observes that the notion escapes a descriptive, versatile, and standardized label. This
writing prefers “open collaboration” (as have others [48, 57, 72]) but recognizes that
“openness for authoring”, “open content curation”, “mass collaboration”, and other
terms are reasonable analogues. Forte and Lampe [57] offer a four part definition
for OCAs, as in italics below. Following each criteria we provide our own strict
interpretation for the purposes of this document. Such constraints allow focused
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discussion on prototypical examples that have interesting security properties. With
that in mind, we consider an OCA to be one that:
1. Enables the collective production of an artifact(s): This is the most funda-
mental and restrictive of conditions. If we interpret an artifact as a file then
“collective production” is equivalent to all collective members having write per-
missions over that file (i.e., the ability to edit it in full). This notion should
be pervasive. That is, atomic artifact(s) must be collectively produced; any
meta-artifact must itself be composed of collectively produced elements.
Should one choose to exercise these permissions their affect should be direct and
immediate; they should not be privy to review except in hindsight. This does
not prevent the establishment of multiple collectives (perhaps hierarchical),
each having access to different artifact set (see #3).
2. Is a technologically mediated collaboration platform: The platform must pro-
vide an interface supporting collective artifact production. These collabora-
tions must be digital, although offline sociological and economic perspectives
on collaboration [108] parallel many of the behavioral observations made herein.
3. Has low barriers for entry and exit : Access should be public (e.g., Internet
enabled) and implicitly granted unless explicitly revoked. Sanity checks such
as required registration or CAPTCHA solves do not constitute high barriers.
Entry is only a guarantee of access to some collective, and we stipulate that
this initial collective must produce one or more public facing artifacts.
4. Supports the emergence of persistent but malleable social structures : There
must be functionality for community coordination and discussion. Haythorn-
thwaite [77] examines such social connectivity and governance in greater depth.
We proceed by discussing familiar examples that are not OCAs. Append only and
monotonically growing content/discussion repositories fail to qualify because they
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are not collectively produced at any granularity. This includes applications like
YouTube, Flickr, forums, and blog/article comments regardless of the fact their con-
tent is user generated (these are aggregated independent artifacts). Collaborative
filtering applications like Reddit, Digg, and Slashdot are also insufficient. Therein,
community voting determines the acceptance and/or prominence of individual con-
tent items (“posts”) towards composing a public facing artifact. These fail in two
dimensions: (1) Voting is an append only action, and (2) supposing participants
could fully “edit” the ordering, this presentation is nonetheless a meta-artifact of
independent posts – failing the atomicity constraint.
Even a platform/software that is OCA capable can be configured such that it is
not in compliance with constraint #3. A tremendous amount of open collaboration
platforms run internal to corporate networks as groupware/enterprise tools [94] or
are Internet-enabled with private access. Others are more subtle in allowing entry
level users to participate but initially preventing or quarantining access to public
facing artifacts. For example, on the software development host GitHub the “fork
and pull” model permits new users to immediately suggest code changes but still
requires project owners to proactively moderate them [45].
Applications that fail one or more of the criteria lack the full dynamism of security
problems we wish to describe. This does not imply they are not OCAs under all
interpretations, nor that they cannot benefit from this work. Prior research [140]
makes explicit the functional overlap between OCAs and an expansive set of web
applications, suggesting how our findings might be broadly applied.
2.2 Practical Use Cases
The need to digitally manage artifact evolution (i.e., version control) is not a recent
one. The origins of modern version control systems (VCS) such as CVS, SVN, and
Git trace back to at least to 1972. It is convenient to think of VCS as middleware
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that provides the generic primitives and interfaces needed for group collaboration.
OCAs build on these primitives and are rarely distinguished by their back end ca-
pabilities (we suspect there is a functional equivalence among all OCA/VCS class
systems [146]). Existing OCAs are best organized by the artifact type their front end
interface is optimized to support. We now describe use cases focusing on unstruc-
tured text (i.e., wikis) (Sec. 2.2.1), structured text (Sec. 2.2.2), and geographical
mapping (Sec. 2.2.3). We then speculate on potential use cases and the paradigm’s
struggle with certain content types (Sec. 2.2.4).
2.2.1 Wikis and Unstructured Text
A wiki [90] is a browser-based OCA capable platform optimized for natural language
artifacts. The system consists of a set of documents and the editing interface is a
simple text editor. A markup language provides text formatting and hyperlinking
between documents is an oft used functionality.
The collaborative encyclopedia Wikipedia [14] is likely the most well known wiki
instance. With rich community governance and vast editing privileges available to
even unregistered users, it is considered the archetype of open collaboration appli-
cations. Using English Wikipedia as a case study this dissertation will examine its
security properties in great detail. However, Wikipedia also has 285+ active language
editions that receive far less research attention (see Sec. 5.4.2). Wikipedia is sup-
ported by the non-profit Wikimedia Foundation [12] (WMF), which also hosts many
other popular wikis: Wiktionary (dictionary), Wikibooks (open source textbooks),
and Wikinews (citizen journalism). The content cultivation in these environments,
and virtually all OCAs, is done a purely volunteer basis. While monetization might
not prove difficult (e.g., via ad revenue), its fair distribution, avoidance of games-
manship, and affect on participation is an unexplored topic.
Wikipedia’s success has been a formative model, with many wikis across the
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Internet employing similarly low barriers to participation. Assuming an open di-
rectory of 10,000+ wiki instances [10] is accurate and representative, 92.5% fit our
OCA definition. Of these 62.5% allow unregistered editing and the other 30% present
minimal barriers to entry. Browsing that same directory [10] a reader can view the
breadth of topics that wikis cover. Many wikis provide encyclopedic coverage of a
subject beyond the depth appropriate for Wikipedia but in a similar style. Liter-
ature, video games, and TV series are all popular wiki themes with every charac-
ter/location/episode having a dedicated document. Regional business listings and
technical documentation are also popular use cases. Most wikis (and OCAs) serve
as reference works, not by chance, but for reasons described in Sec. 4.1.1. Moreover,
installations like AskDrWiki [3] for medical professionals demonstrate that wikis are
pervading domains with significant information security ramifications.
There are 100+ different software implementations of the wiki model, but evi-
dence shows that 95%+, including Wikipedia, use the Mediawiki engine [6, 10]. User
familiarity and a considerable quantity of plug-ins/extensions no doubt influence this
statistic. Wikifarms provide central wiki hosting as a service, the most prominent
being Wikia [9] with a further 300,000+ communities running Mediawiki software.
This homogeneity means that both beneficial tools and harmful attacks that build
atop Mediawiki’s API have a tremendous range of portability.
2.2.2 Structured Text
While Wikipedia and other wikis hold a tremendous amount of data their natural
language format does not lend itself to easy information extraction or machine read-
ability. Sites like Freebase and DBpedia have been moderately successful in parsing
ontologies and relational models from unstructured wiki data. However, it is more
intuitive to explicitly annotate these relationships when creating content: the ob-
jective of semantic wikis. Simple software extensions such as Semantic Mediawiki
provide this functionality and have seen moderate deployment.
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Wikidata, launched in late 2012, seeks to bring these tools to the forefront. The
objective is to build a centralized knowledge repository from which Wikipedia’s 200+
language editions (and other projects) will query, eliminating the redundant and
multilingual duplication of facts [132]. The security challenges of such a shift are not
yet known but certainly suggests less reliance on natural language detection. Similar
conclusions can be drawn regarding increasing wiki support for interpreted language
content (everything from inline specification of GNUplot graphs to environments like
XWiki that support server-side script authoring/execution).
2.2.3 Geographical Mapping
One OCA domain where non-textual interfaces have proven successful is collabora-
tive geographical mapping [65]. OpenStreetMap [7] (OSM) “The Free Wiki World
Map” is perhaps the most popular example, followed by WikiMapia and Google Map
Maker. Traditional wiki software does not power these instances but their reuse of
“wiki” vocabulary demonstrates how that term has grown to represent an entire col-
laborative philosophy and ethos. OSM supports multiple artifact types (e.g., nodes
and routes) that reside on map tiles and are added/modified using a rich mapping
interface. Intentional malicious damage has been observed in these environments.
Autonomous methods for its detection are in their infancy [48, 101], some building
on the techniques presented in this dissertation.
2.2.4 Application Challenges
With textual and map interfaces being the predominant OCA use cases one might
wonder why the paradigm has not expanded to other file types. Binary files prove
particularly challenging. The Wikimedia Commons [11] serves as a collaborative
repository for 16+ million media files. However, file modifications are external to
the interface, new versions replace prior copies, editing is non-compositional, and
there is no diff functionality between historical versions. A majority of these files are
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the work of just one author.
This suggests that for meaningful collaboration to take place artifacts need to
have a compositional structure, i.e., a grammar/language. Presumably this language
needs to be complex enough that it demands new interfaces instead of reusing wiki’s
textual functionality. In mapping examples, the interface enables a visual represen-
tation and avoids the handling of precise geocoordinates. So while binary images
might not be ideal, one could imagine the shape-driven composition of flowcharts or
organizational diagrams as in presentation software. Metavid [47] is striving for the
collaborative transcription of videos, which involves both text and temporal cues.
Additionally, musical notation has been suggested as an area ripe for exploration.
2.3 Terminology
While this work intends to speak broadly about OCA security we prefer to use wiki
terminology in doing so because: (1) English Wikipedia is our case study, (2) there
is a sparsity of non-wiki examples, and (3) the wiki approach has been influential
on subsequent non-wiki environments. It is our intention to avoid the vast and
specialized vocabulary of many Wikipedia specific discussions [32, 37, 38].
A wiki is an OCA composed of document artifacts, which Wikipedia calls arti-
cles in its encyclopedic context. These documents are interlinked using hyperlinks,
termed internal links or wikilinks. These are distinct from links with a destination
outside the wiki: external links. Documents may be organized into namespaces that
are used for scoping purposes. For example, a document “A” may reside in the main
namespace, while document “Talk:A” exists to discuss that article (in the “talk”
namespace). Different namespaces may imply different editing conventions, and it is
common to see these for purposes of discussion, help, and policy.
Every document, d, has an associated version history. The initial version, d0,
is empty. The most recent version is that displayed by default. The transition
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dn−1 ; dn is termed an edit or revision, the fundamental action by which all changes
are made. A special kind of edit, a revert or undo, restores the content of a previous
version, i.e., if version dn = dn−2 then dn−1 was reverted. A revision has an associated
edit summary where the editor can concisely describe/justify the change.
Every revision has a single editor, author, or contributor. Editors are assigned
some type of identifier (i.e., a username) although they are not necessarily persistent.
Wikipedia allows unregistered1 editing using one’s (possibly dynamic) IP address as
an identifier. Regardless the registration status one’s identifier is generally referred
to as an account. Some accounts may have administrative privileges that pertain to
the blocking of users and the locking of artifacts. In addition to administration and
editing simply reading wiki content can be interpreted as a form of participation.
Taken as a whole the user base is referred to as a community.
2.4 Threat Model
In examining the security of open collaboration we need to be explicit about the
threats we aim to mitigate. This includes those behaviors considered damaging
(Sec. 2.4.1) and the capabilities attackers have in mounting such offenses (Sec. 2.4.2).
2.4.1 Scope of Damage/Defense
Damage: Herein we considered damage to include any act that blatantly compro-
mises the integrity of an open collaboration application. To be blatant a change
must egregiously decrease the value of an artifact as objectively determined by com-
munity members over application specific objectives. For example, Wikipedia is a
reference work that values factual accuracy, and therefore newly contributed text is
1Note that this is sometimes erroneously termed anonymous editing. In fact, opaque identifiers
reveal far less information than an IP address that could be geolocated or associated to some
organization. Generally speaking the IP addresses that operate registered accounts are treated as
private data and revealed only for security investigations with probable cause.
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predominately judged along these terms. Obviously false statements are treated as
blatant damage, while a statement with any degree of truth but ill-formed otherwise
is treated more favorably (e.g., removed without force, moved into discussion space,
or modified into compliance). Establishing such distinctions is terminologically and
practically challenging, with the latter relying heavily on precedent. In this disser-
tation we rely on Wikipedia experts to make these distinctions for us, by mining
their implicit actions to generate corpora. This approach allows detection models to
capture community conventions no matter how difficult they may be to codify.
A large percentage of blatantly unconstructive actions are vandalism, a term
implying intentional damage in both Wikipedia and non-digital definitions. The
ability to determine intent, especially in a semi-anonymous Internet scale system, is
dubious at best. For this reason we prefer to ignore this constraint and consider all
blatant surface level damage as vandalism. We recognize that portions of vandalism
may be non-intentional and therefore labels like attacker and malicious need to be
carefully used. Regardless, our primary focus is the persistent and dynamic threats
posed by intentional actors.
Vandalism consists of a diverse set of behaviors which manifest in various ways.
Others have created taxonomies describing this space [114, 131] and we offer our own
characterizations in Sec. 4.1.1. One subset is of particular interest in this work, link
spam: blatant violations of external link policy. Another interesting set we consider
has intersection with vandalism: edits redacted over privacy and liability concerns.
This latter case makes evident there can be blatant damage which is not van-
dalism. Copyright violations are often fundamentally good content that cannot be
included due to the provenance of that information (i.e., the concern is not “surface
level”). Such cases also make clear that “blatant” does not necessarily mean “trivial
to detect”. Making a damage determination might require subject expertise or ex-
ternal evidence not held by all users. However, we assume there would be no debate
over a “blatant damage” classification if all such information were available.
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Defense task: Our goal is the efficient mitigation of qualifying damage instances.
We are concerned foremost with zero-delay detection, assessing edits using only
evidence available at the time they are committed. The task of historical detec-
tion [28, 143] is relevant in building hindsight based reputation metrics (Sec. 5.2.2),
but we not consider its broader implications as we have discussed in [28, 143].
It is our objective to mitigate damage without altering wiki infrastructure. We
seek efficient ways to reuse existing functionality rather than suggesting mechanisms
that limit open collaboration semantics (these practical security tradeoffs are touched
on in Sec. 7.1.3). Finally, we aim to secure only the main namespace of content
development, not the adjacent discussion/social/policy spaces.
2.4.2 Attacker Capabilities
Having established what qualifies as damage we now outline the vectors available to
actors in mounting such attacks. First, damage must manifest via editing actions.
For example, DDOS attacks on artifacts or software compromises are not considered.
This damage must occur in public-facing and plain text content. This means the
addition/inclusion of inappropriate images on Wikipedia articles is outside our scope.
Moreover, the impact of this damage must be immediate. One cannot externally link
to a webpage under their control and purposefully change the content at that link
at some later point in time (e.g., a TOCTTOU attack).
We assume attackers have editing permissions over the entire main namespace
and that they can modify any aspect of those documents. These changes could be
as subtle as re-organization of existing content or the addition/removal of a single
token. Conversely, tactics can be blatant, e.g., the blanking of article content. An
attacker may distribute his/her changes over the course of multiple edit commits.
The articles being modified are expected to be independent in nature with content
or infrastructure not being transcluded/imported from centralized templates.
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We assume human actors perform the editing actions, doing so through the nor-
mal editing interface. Editing scripts and direct API access are not considered. The
speed at which an attacker can edit is limited only by human and network constraints.
The IP address(es) from which an attacker operates is that (are those) natively as-
signed to the machine(s) they are using. An attacker is free to use any/all machines
or IP addresses at their immediate disposal but cannot use proxy, cloud, or botnet
services to obtain great degrees of IP agility. Using these an attacker is free to create
multiple/Sybil accounts, which may be registered, anonymous, or any combination
thereof. These accounts can be operated in a deceptive manner, perhaps performing
some quantity of constructive edits before placing damage. However, attackers shall
not attain advanced or administrative privileges.
This threat model does make simplifying assumptions but it still captures the
vast majority of attacks we have observed against Wikipedia in the wild. In Sec. 7.2
we relax some of these criteria to describe potentially problematic, but to this point,
hypothetical attack scenarios. While these present challenging security burdens such
strategies also require tremendous attacker investment, the security economics of
which remain an unexplored question.
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Chapter 3
Related Work
In this chapter we examine related work pertaining to damage discovery and miti-
gation in online collaborative environments. We begin with technical work specific
to wikis and Wikipedia (Sec. 3.1) before looking more broadly to other collaborative
applications, e.g., forums, blogs, and social networks (Sec. 3.2). Then, social factors
in the collaborative security process are examined; those pertaining to perpetrators
of damage as well as those who mitigate it (Sec. 3.3).
3.1 Technical Wiki Defense
As the prototypical open collaboration application there has been much Wikipedia
specific research on damage discovery and quality assessment. Authors have ap-
proached the problem with differing intentions and granularity, and we begin by
synthesizing these varying perspectives (Sec. 3.1.1). Then, the three main technical
approaches are described: language (Sec. 3.1.2), content persistence (Sec. 3.1.3), and
metadata (Sec. 3.1.4). For each we provide an operational overview and enumerate
individual works in the domain. In the next chapter we consider the performance and
shortcomings of these techniques when they are considered alongside measurement
studies of Wikipedia damage.
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3.1.1 Contextualizing Literature
When examining Wikipedia literature one will find that systems claim to identify or
measure different qualities, among them “vandalism” [42, 80], “trust” [51, 95, 155],
and “quality” [35, 125, 152]. Such terminological distinctions are irrelevant given this
writing’s focus on blatant damage, a more coarse grained problem than the detailed
assessments claimed by “trust” and “quality” methods. Virtually all systems in
literature are trained and evaluated as two class problems drawn from the extremities
of the quality continuum of Fig. 3.1. For this reason we express doubt in the ability to
make fine grained distinctions. While expert manual analyses have been performed
regarding Wikipedia’s accuracy [62, 116], computational parallels seem elusive given
that notions such as “trust” are ill-defined and subjective [85].
Systems also assess different wiki entities, focusing on (1) articles, (2) article
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fragments, (3) revisions, or (4) editors. We assume that these entities have asso-
ciative relationships, as visualized in Fig. 3.2. That is, if one can assess any one of
these granularity, then this assessment can be mapped to the other three entities.
For example, a system that examines document fragments could be run over every
fragment written by some author and then an aggregate function applied to make an
assessment of that author. This does not imply that approaches work equally well at
all granularity. In this dissertation our solutions are optimized for operation at the
revision level. Given that edits are the atomic unit of interaction on wikis this seems
most intuitive. However, this does not preclude evidence about other entities from
being included in a revision level assessment. Note that an assessment is simply
the output of an anti-damage system. Most often this is a behavior predictive real
number that speaks to the probability some entity is damaging.
3.1.2 Language Approaches
Approach: Natural language processing (NLP) analyzes the textual content of ad-
ditions/removals during a revision on the presumption that damage exhibits different
lexical, syntactic, or semantic properties compared to constructive text:
• Lexical features are those drawn from the surface level properties of text. These
can include token lists or regular expressions that capture vulgarity and slang
(indicating damage) or identify advanced editing syntax (likely a benign user).
Alternatively, they may include statistical measures that search for repeated
characters, calculate word lengths, or calculate alphanumeric character ratios.
Fig. 3.3 shows an example of simple lexical analysis being performed over an
edit diff using handwritten scoring rules.
• Syntactic analysis examines text structure, most often achieved by examining
part-of-speech (POS) sequences. Using a POS tagger one can compare the
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DIFF
+++Yourmomstinks
....
--- [[BenFranklin]]
(\b)yourmom(\b) -5
(\b)sucks(\b) -10
(\b)stinks(\b) -5
(\b) [[ .* ]] (\b) +5
RegexScoring
-1× Σ
-5
-5
-10
=-15
Figure 3.3: Example of edit scoring using lexical features
likelihood of contributed sequences to pre-computed probabilities. Improba-
ble POS sequences are indicative of improper grammatical constructions and
possibly damaging contributions.
• Semantic features capture the meaning of text. For example, using a tagged
corpus of vandalism and innocent edits one can perform Bayesian bag-of-words
(BOW) analysis [117] to perform document classification. Given that certain
sequences of tokens (i.e., n-grams) appear more often in one class than the
other one can compute the product of these probabilities to determine the
most likely class for an unlabeled edit’s token sequences.
Associated Works: Lexical techniques were among the first brought to bear on
Wikipedia’s anti-damage problem. The works of Potthast et al. [112] and later, Ve-
lasco [130, 99], have well-explored this space. Similarly, Rassbach et al. [115] used
a set of “about 50 features” from a lexical NLP toolkit. These early works found
features capturing offensive language, excessive capitalization, and repeated charac-
ters to be most indicative of damaging/vandal behavior. Practically speaking, from
from mid-2007 to late-2010, “ClueBot” formed the bulk of Wikipedia’s autonomous
anti-vandal defense using ≈100 handwritten regular expressions capturing many of
the above patterns. Leveraging lexical word/sentence lengths, readability metrics
(e.g., Flesch-Kincaid, SMOG) have also been shown moderately effective [115, 125].
Syntactically, Wang et al. [134] were straightforward in their use of POS tag-
ging and probabilities. Harpalani et al. [76] went one step further with their use
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Figure 3.4: Example of topic-specific semantic modeling
of context free grammars (CFGs) using deep stylometric features. Typically used
for author identification, the authors showed the methods could identify stylistic
elements atypical of Wikipedia’s constructive language patterns.
Probabilistic semantic approaches have also been seen in various forms. Chin
et al. [42] used a generic predictive analysis, Smets et al. [121] used Probabilistic
Sequence Modeling, and Itakure et al. [80] leveraged dynamic Markov compression.
These methods use tagged vandalism corpora produced exclusively over Wikipedia
edits to produce probabilities. That same approach is put into practice by “Clue-
Bot NG” [36] which uses a neural network classifier. That system has been En-
glish Wikipedia’s primary means of autonomous anti-vandal defense since late-2010.
Rather than using Wikipedia derived corpora Wang et al. [134] uses topic specific
learning via a search engine’s top-k results when queried for an article title. As perfor-
mance improvements over generic methods demonstrate, these web documents con-
siderably extend the classifiers base of “topic appropriate” token sequences. Fig. 3.4
shows a simplified unigram (n = 1) usage of the technique.
3.1.3 Content Persistence Approaches
Approach: Content persistence approaches are built on the intuition that the sur-
vival of text through subsequent revisions speaks favorably about: (1) the quality of
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Figure 3.5: Example content persistence calculation
the text fragment and (2) the reputation of its author. Content surviving (or restored
by) future revisions, especially those of reputable authors, is likely trustworthy.
Assume author A has made edit rn on an article and some time later author B ed-
its the same article committing version rn+1. At this point, the reputation of author
A can be updated proportional to four factors: (1) the size of A’s contribution, (2)
the text survival of rn relative to rn+1, (3) the edit distance (capturing organizational
changes) of rn relative to rn+1, and (4) the reputation of B. The reputation of A will
be further updated at each subsequent edit until a specified depth is reached. The
reputation of A speaks directly to the trustworthiness of A’s prior authorship, which
is especially useful in judging new contributions of A which are yet to be vetted by
subsequent editors.
Figure 3.5 visualizes an example run of the content persistence algorithm. Assume
all authors are equally trusted and author A1 initializes the “Benjamin Franklin”
article with content to form version V1. The actions of editor A2 in version V2
challenge the veracity of A1, since he modifies content from V1. However, when A3
restores the content of A1/V1, it is A2’s reputation which is punished. When V4 is
committed, A2’s reputation is further reduced, A1 continues to accrue reputation for
his content’s survival, and A3 is rewarded for the persistence of his revert action.
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Associated Works: The work of Adler et al. [27, 29], the practical implementa-
tion of which is called “WikiTrust”, has been definitive in the development of content
persistence reputation. It is both a formalization and refinement upon the informal
proposal made in [44] by Cross, which suggested that text age may be indicative of
fragment trust. The system most related to Adler’s is that of Zeng et al. [155] who
used Dynamic Bayesian networks to model article quality. Whereas Adler computes
predictive author reputation, Zeng uses predefined roles (e.g., administrator, regis-
tered, anonymous, etc.) as an input to his reputation system. Finally, Wöhner et
al. [152] measure content persistence and transience throughout an article’s lifespan.
He finds that quality articles are defined by periods of high editing intensity, whereas
low quality articles tend to undergo little modification as they mature.
3.1.4 Metadata Approaches
Approach: If we consider revisions to be the fundamental building blocks of a wiki
system then metadata is any property which describes those revisions. We divide
metadata into two sets: (1) content-exclusive and (2) content-inclusive:
• Content-exclusive: These properties consider descriptors external of arti-
cle text. For example, each edit has a: (1) timestamp, (2) editor, (3) article
title, and (4) edit summary. These can then be directly quantified, aggregated
(for example, to compute the number of unique editors in an article’s history),
or combined with external information (i.e., off-wiki resources).
• Content-inclusive: These measures permit inspection of the article or diff
text (e.g., document length or the number of images in that document). Indeed,
some degree of text parsing is required to extract these properties. We prefer
language driven features of this kind to be classified as lexical NLP signals and
structurally driven ones considered metadata.
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Content-Exclusive Features
Editor Article
· Registration status · Edits in history
· Special permissions · Authors in history
Revision Summary Timestamp
· Comment length · UTC hour/day
Content-Inclusive Features
· Article length · Revision diff size
· Num. external links · Num. images
Table 3.1: Example metadata features [35, 112, 125]
Metadata indicators capture varied and often subtle aspects regarding participants,
content evolution, and the social context in which they operate. Table 3.1 lists
several example features of each type.
Associated Works: Existing metadata systems tend to operate at article gran-
ularity. For example, Stvilia et al. [125] aggregate multiple metadata features to
produce measures of information quality (IQ). IQ metrics [133] are properties like
completeness, informativeness, and consistency that define document quality (even
outside of wikis [156]). Stvilia’s contribution is the quantification of these metrics
via the use of wiki metadata. For example, a measure of completeness considers
the article length and the number of internal links. Similar is the work of Dondio
et al. [51]. Dondio begins by formally modeling the Wikipedia infrastructure and
identifying ten “propositions about trustworthiness of articles”, but only develops
two metrics in full, realizing just three of the propositions. Surprising compared to
the complexity of these approaches, Blumenstock [35] claims that a single metadata
metric – article word count – is the best indicator of document quality.
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Network Citations Topic-specific link-ratio
Philadelphia:
… famous residents include 
Ben Franklin, William Penn…
Bifocals:
… eyewear invented by [[Ben 
Franklin]] for those…
Benjamin 
Franklin
LINK-RATIO:
50
2
1 .
_
_
==
refstotal
refslinked
Figure 3.6: Example link-ratio calculation
One subset of content-inclusive metadata pertains to link-ratio algorithms. Sim-
ilar to the way PageRank [106] computes website reputation based on the Internet
scale hyperlink graph McGuinness et al. [95] and Bellomi et al. [33] mine Wikipedia’s
wikilink graph. The authors argue the decision to wikilink another article (rather
than just leaving the subject in plaintext) is an implicit recommendation of that
article (see Fig. 3.6), permitting the technique to identify quality articles. In our
assessments linking behaviors appear to be driven more by convention than quality,
and regardless, the evolution of the link graph is far too slow to be useful for efficient
damage discovery. The strategy is not one we pursue further.
3.2 Perspective Outside Open Collaboration
The modification semantics of open collaboration give rise to a rather expansive
interpretation of what is considered damaging behavior (Sec. 4.1.1). Most other
collaborative applications are concerned with a narrow subset of this space, with
the technical detection of “cyberbullying”, offensive content, and personal insults in
online communities receiving sparse attention [50, 122, 153].
While Wikipedia may be the definitive test bed for vandalism research the same
cannot be said for link spam behaviors. Our characterizations in Sec. 4.1.2 and
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[137, 139] were the first to address spamming behaviors in a wiki-specific fashion.
Thus, we draw from related collaborative fields in trying to develop a baseline anti-
spam strategy. The anti-spam strategies of commenting functionality and social
networks are well surveyed by Heymann et al. [79]. While straightforward lexical and
syntactic features are effective [34], more popular is the notion of “language model
disagreement”. Because comment spam tends to be machine authored (using tools
like XRumer [23, 120]) spam posts often are not topic relevant to the content being
commented on [34, 98]. Additional work has examined the participatory dynamics
of spam users, capturing their bursty and atypical contribution patterns in metadata
features [69, 79]. Others have observed that link spam tends to originate from certain
IP ranges, suggesting the use of reputation style metrics [26].
An alternative school of thought is to focus on the URL payload included with
a spam comment/post by obtaining the source document at that address. Spam
landing sites tend to show linguistic and structural evidence of commercial intention
and/or search engine optimization (SEO) strategies [46, 103]. Additionally, Niu et
al. [102] found the mere process of obtaining that document was often predictive
with spam sites using cloaking and redirection to prevent domain blacklisting.
Practical anti-spam for comments and forums tends to be carried out by propri-
etary systems such as Akismet [1] and Defensio [4] which easily interface with pop-
ular publishing platforms. We presume these integrate many of the aforementioned
techniques with the added benefit of global perspective over attacks in progress.
3.3 Social Aspects
Even as computational damage detection techniques advance it is inevitable that
classifiers will produce true negatives, borderline cases, and struggle over certain
content types. The burden of mitigating these cases falls to human users. For smaller
online communities, brute force methods performed by a small set of permissioned
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moderators might suffice. Massive content repositories like Facebook and YouTube
require more scalable solutions. In practice these sites use low cost outsourced labor
to manually review incidents flagged by software or end users [40, 41, 124]. Those
citations also describe the psychological toll on these employees who spend hours
each day reviewing hate speech, pornography, and violent images.2 The unrewarding
nature of review work suggests it may be difficult to get volunteer users to fulfill such
roles. Moreover, the complex image classification guidelines Facebook distributes
to its reviewers [41] offer an interesting perspective into the difficulty of codifying
objective enforcement policies over user generated content.
Open collaboration applications make mitigation more dynamic in that there are
no defined security actors with formal commitments to the task. Besides charac-
terizing their tremendous workload and dedication, little analysis has been done on
Wikipedia’s (or any comparable) workforce. Geiger and Ribes [60] hint at the coordi-
nation and tools available to these users, an ecosystem we describe in greater detail
in Sec. 4.2. Wikipedia’s mitigation is becoming an increasingly mechanized and
structured process; widely interpreted as beneficial technical progress. Halfaker et
al. [72, 73] counters this with social evidence that robotic actors and template driven
warnings are negatively impacting recruitment efforts. Recall that not all damage is
the result of malicious actions (Sec. 2.4.1) and well intentioned but ignorant users
can easily run afoul of Wikipedia’s litany of policies [38].
Information about the demographics and motives of online vandals is also sparse,
but there are interesting parallels to criminal justice studies of the physical phe-
nomenon [64]. In the online forum domain some perspective has been offered into
behavioral strategies to curb incentives for disruptive “flamers” and “trolls”, primar-
ily by ignoring their inflammatory tactics [78, 89]. Meanwhile, the monetary motives
of link spammers are far more intuitive, a fact that makes it easier to model their
behavior, yet also suggests they will be evasive of any protections put in place.
2We have been advised by our University’s Office of the General Counsel to avoid non-textual
analyses for legal reasons, primarily those surrounding child pornography [149].
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Chapter 4
Characterizing Defense
Shortcomings
In order to create/improve anti-damage solutions one must first understand the in-
cidents themselves. We conduct measurement studies that characterize the task and
highlight the weaknesses of current computational solutions (Sec. 4.1). Then we
focus on the deficiencies of human mitigation strategies by modeling that ecosys-
tem and demonstrating that it lacks organizational primitives that could prevent
redundant labor and latent damage response (Sec. 4.2).
4.1 Measurement Studies
When conducting measurement studies over damage we use corpora built from the
actions of Wikipedia experts. For each damage type we: (1) motivate investigation
into the particular type, (2) characterize/quantify the behaviors that qualify as dam-
age, (3) analyze the performance shortcomings of related work, and (4) understand
how modification semantics give rise to novel challenges. Vandalism (Sec. 4.1.1)
has been characterized in prior literature and the deficiencies of existing anti-vandal
systems can be shown via empirical evaluation. Being the first to describe spam
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(Sec. 4.1.2) and privacy/liability (Sec. 4.1.3) concerns in open collaboration, we de-
vote considerable space to their characterization and measurement. Then we use this
to speculate about the applicability of related work from non-OCA environments.
4.1.1 Vandalism
Motivations: Our investigation into vandalism is foremost motivated by the fact
it is an extremely prevalent problem. Over 7%+ of English Wikipedia edits are
vandalism, generating over a quarter-million vandal edits per month as of this writ-
ing [22, 110]. These are most often acts of malice; the single most edited page on
Wikipedia is that used to block persistent vandals where over 500,000 accounts and
IP addresses have had their privileges revoked. The large amount of academic and
practical research brought to bear on the task (Sec. 3.1) also give some indication
of the challenges involved. As our measurements will reveal and prior work has sug-
gested these are solutions not scaling adequately [63]. When instances come to the
attention of media outlets and/or a person of influence it can result in considerable
criticism for Wikipedia and the open collaboration paradigm. For example, fake
biographies [119] and death hoaxes [107] have not been uncommon and occasionally
these errors are re-reported by traditional media [109].
Characterization: Other authors have quantified taxonomies of anti-vandal be-
haviors [114, 131] and there is no need to duplicate those efforts here. Further, a
Wikipedia policy page highlights 30+ specific characterizations [21]. For the benefit
of readers we convey examples of the most common behaviors seen in the authors’
personal experience of reviewing 50,000+ potential vandalism instances:
• Profanity and vulgarity: Inappropriate language is extremely common
and rarely accompanies value-adding text.
• Personal opinions: Statements such as “Benjamin Franklin is no fun” are
unsourced and without merit. Especially common in rivalry situations such as
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politics, sporting teams, and performing artists.
• Unjustified blanking: The removal of large blocks of text without justifi-
cation (especially long lived and citation inclusive text).
• Narcissism: Vandals mark their presence (e.g., “Alice was here!”), include
themselves as “notable alumni” on institutional articles, and/or make them-
selves part of history (e.g., replacing “Ben Franklin” with their own name).
• Proof of edit-ability: Others are captivated by wiki functionality and are
eager to report such (e.g., “I can actually change this?!”).
• Random insertions and non-sense: Offenses characterized by randomness
(e.g., “asdf”), repeated characters, smilies, and extreme use of copy-paste.
• Attempts at comedy: Despite being damaging, some revisions’ attempts
at entertainment prove quite successful.
Language shortcomings: Language based detection of vandalism has been pop-
ular in both research and practice. One of the most common and standardized
methods, Bayesian document classification [117], can autonomously reject less than
50% of vandalism at tolerable false positive rates [36] (see Sec. 5.1 for more about
that threshold). To understand this poor performance we compare the output of one
such algorithm [36] with a human labeled set (the vandalism corpora described in
Sec. 5.2.1). We focus attention on the true negatives, i.e., vandalism instances that
evaded language based detection. We find several trends to be common.
First, many edits add information which is blatantly untrue but do so in an
encyclopedic style. That is, they are syntactically well formed, lexically well format-
ted, and semantically appropriate – but the payload itself is categorically false. The
interpretation of mis-truth as damage appears to be one unique to open collabora-
tion and a social outgrowth of collective production, i.e., granting the modification
permission. Consider the overarching social objective of OCAs: to cultivate a defini-
tive/authoritative artifact. Our survey of OCA use cases in Sec. 2.2 showed that in
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purpose they overwhelmingly have some notion of “correctness”, often serving as ref-
erence works or documentation. This contrasts with the role of simple “append only”
collaborative applications that often support opinion sharing and artistic interpreta-
tion. The condition that factual inaccuracies can be damaging imposes a significant,
if not fundamental, computational hurdle – given the lack of an oracle that can as-
sess the veracity of a statement. Wang’s [134] suggestion of using web queries to
supplement language models is an improvement over simple Bayesian approaches
but can only ensure contributions have context appropriate language. Indeed, most
grossly inaccurate statements that are non-offensive and well formatted will evade
current vandalism/language filters. It appears the näıvety of the average vandal is
one reason computational methods achieve even moderate success.
Second, we observe that small payloads prove difficult for language based methods
to assess. Most vandalism consists of less than 1KB of diff data. In some cases only a
few characters are available for analysis. Consider that these changes need not “stand
alone” and instead build off the context of existing content. Such difficulties are
rooted in the technical semantics and representation of editing operations. Append
only models have artifacts which are submitted in an independent and whole fashion:
An entire video is submitted to YouTube; a blog comment must be a complete
statement. In contrast, OCA modification actions operate in a dependent fashion
and damage can appear at arbitrary location(s) inside a document.
In a similar manner, other edits yield no language tokens for analysis. Mod-
ifications can be purely re-organizational and alterations to numerical data (e.g.,
intentionally skewed records for sports teams) cannot be modeled as language to-
kens. Content removals also prove challenging to assess. Techniques like stylometric
analysis [76] are explicit that they cannot handle such cases. Others invert the
probabilities that would be obtained if the content were added (e.g., the removal
of “good” tokens indicates vandalism) and fail to capture aspects of the edit mat-
uration process. Finally, consider that some edits are a complex combination of
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additions, removals, and reorganizations and how to best aggregate such actions is
an unexplored area of research.
Reputation shortcomings: User reputation gleaned implicitly from content sur-
vival is an alternative tactic to detect vandalism. By examining performance of the
WikiTrust implementation [27, 29] over vandalism corpora (as described in Sec. 5.2.1)
we can learn about the performance shortcomings of that approach.
We find sparse behavioral histories are a severe detriment. When there is little or
no behavioral history to mine the algorithms only produce default or null reputation
values that have no predictive intelligence (the “cold start” problem). This is a
problem exacerbated in OCA environments where:
1. Low participation barriers generate many new/Sybil accounts [52]. Wikipedia
has 4.3 million registered accounts and under 40% have made 3+ edits [22].
2. Some configurations do not require persistent identifiers. Roughly 30% of
Wikipedia’s 350 million article edits were performed by unregistered users [22],
with 66% of these contributions being likely vandalism [81]. While unregistered
users are 83% of all editing “accounts” the IP addresses used to identify such
users can rarely be treated as persistent due to shared use settings (e.g., com-
puter labs) or DHCP addressing.
3. New users perpetrate most damage actions. Dynamism concerns force one to
treat most unregistered accounts as new ones, and the median age of damaging
registered accounts is just 1.6 hours [142].
As a result of these factors we find a tremendous amount of vandals have null repu-
tation when they perpetrate their damage. Even if an editor has prior edits, realize
that reputations have latency given their dependence on subsequent action.
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Metadata shortcomings: Metadata approaches to damage detection are not so
much a centralized methodology as they are a collection of diverse data points. The
information quality metrics of Stvilia [125] were optimized for article quality assess-
ments and translate poorly to revision granularity. Further, the arbitrary and static
multi-variable aggregations they utilize are inelegant and unnecessary. Many of the
individual metadata components they amass are individually meaningful and indica-
tive of damage. While current metadata features have no fundamental shortcomings,
they also suggest unexplored opportunities.
Moving forward: Recognizing the limitations of related work is formative in es-
tablishing our anti-vandal approach moving forward. Language approaches are quite
mature and such content-centric approaches appear to have fundamental shortcom-
ings. Therefore we prefer to concentrate on complementary methods and ultimately
evaluate our improvements in combination with language techniques. Reputation
was hampered by the cold start problem, a shortcoming we counter through the de-
velopment of spatial reputation: judging new entities based on how related/adjacent
entities have behaved in the past.
With metadata we continue the development of features that speak to mis-
behavior and participatory dynamics at the revision level. Ultimately, signals of
all types are comparatively and cumulatively evaluated using machine learning tech-
niques. Despite being driven foremost by improving anti-vandalism metrics on En-
glish Wikipedia, we are also mindful that it is just a single open collaboration use
case. Moving forward we strive to develop features (in contrast to much of related
work) that do not make assumptions about content types or capture encyclopedic
idiosyncrasies.
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4.1.2 Link Spam
Motivations: Wikipedia’s objective interests (like those of most OCAs) often con-
flict with those of marketing departments, ghostwriters, and devotees to any par-
ticular institution. Wikipedia has to confront paid consultants [104, 105] and re-
ject/block the contributions of biased parties [24, 145].
Interesting security problems arise when parties knowingly commit damage for
self-interest and/or monetization, as we suspected might be common with external
link spam on Wikipedia. We presume these incentives motivate spammers to exhibit
sophistication, evasiveness, resource utilization, and adaptive strategies not seen with
simple vandalism. Moreover, Wikipedia has no autonomous protection against link
spam besides a reactive blacklist. This is a tremendous burden to human reviewers
(or worse, end users) who might encounter malware or questionable content beyond
the relative safety of the host platform. Our proposed solutions can not only ease
the burden on these reviewers but also diminish the utility of spam actions given
that damage survival is likely proportional to attacker yield.
Characterization & measurement: External link spam on Wikipedia must be
performed with direct intentions: the goal being for end users to view the spam link
(an exposure) and choose to click it (a click-through) and visit the landing site [86].
Attempts to use Wikipedia for search engine optimization (SEO) purposes ceased in
early 2007 when HTML nofollow was enabled for all outgoing links. Our focus is
on external link spam and we investigate only well formed links of this type.3
As we describe at greater length in [139], external spam link must violate link
policy [15] and transgressions pertain either to a link’s presentation or destination.
Link presentation wraps four factors: (1) the accuracy of the hyperlink description,
(2) the appropriateness of the link formatting, (3) where in the article the link is
3Wikipedia “spam” is broader than well formed external links. For example: (1) Internal
wikilinks could be used overzealously to draw attention to a topic, (2) an entire article could
be commercially motivated, or (3) publishers/authors might spam on behalf of offline resources.
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Figure 4.1: Geographical distribution of spamming IP addresses
placed, and (4) the article to which it is placed. Such placement issues are orthogo-
nal to the destination being linked. Though criteria are many [15], it suffices to say
that commercial sites, promotional offerings, and narcissistic linking behaviors are
prohibited. The practicalities of spam behaviors are quantified via a measurement
study, the full details of which are described in [139]. That analysis and our im-
mediate summary utilize the 6,000+ element spam corpus we develop in Sec. 5.3.1,
built atop the implicit actions of Wikipedia experts. Here we summarize our most
significant findings to be:
• Atypical spam: Comparing Wikipedia spam URLs against the Spamhaus DBL
blacklist (email spam domains) and Google Safe Browsing project blacklists
(phishing/malware) produced virtually no intersection. Similarly, the IPs and
geolocation of perpetrators (Fig. 4.1) matched typical editing patterns instead
of those identified in measurement studies of “traditional” spamming [139].
• Little direct commercialism: Classifying corpus URLs through a link directory
taxonomy [5] produces Fig. 4.2, suggesting a diversity of spam types. Extensive
manual tagging as per Tab. 4.1 reveals that just 15% of spam links had direct
commercial intentions (i.e., products immediately for sale in an online fashion).
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Figure 4.2: Spam corpus URLs classified by genre [5]
• Indirect commercialism: Spam for brick-and-mortar businesses was not un-
common, including: (1) small business webpages, (2) bulk regional listings of
such businesses (see Tab. 4.1), and (3) “information adjacent services”, where
a site provides encyclopedic information but also sells a related service. For
example, a local restaurant may try to link their website from articles for the
city and state in which it resides.
• Data clearinghouses : So called “non-authoritative clearinghouses” are com-
mon spam destinations: web portals into databases of third party data. For
example, a “soccer statistics” clearinghouse may have pages for teams/players,
providing the potential for many link points on the wiki. These sites tend
to republish information from more official sources and be aggressive in their
on-Wikipedia promotion (see Tab. 4.2).
• Conventional placement : Spammers tend to follow linking conventions, avoid
blanket spamming of context inappropriate articles, and do not abuse style or
placement capabilities in order to increase visual prominence. Per Tab. 4.1,
only about 2% of spam instances violate these conventions.
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DESTINATION PROPERTY %-age
Commercial storefront 15.5%
Local directory or tourism 7.8%
Social media destinations 2.4%
Foreign language page 1.9%
Adult or offensive link 0.5%
PLACEMENT PROPERTY %-age
Link uncorrelated w/article 0.9%
Unusual link placement 0.9%
Visual manipulation of link 0.2%
Table 4.1: Characterizing spam properties; these are indepen-
dent/disjoint properties (thus columns do not sum to 100%) that only
aim to capture interesting behaviors in the problem space.
• Little URL reuse: Of the nearly 5k spam corpus members, 80% of URLs and
50% of domains are unique. Only 14 domains appear 10+ times and 71% of
domains appear just once. In practice one needs to look at the spam:ham ratio
of a domain to learn about its behavioral patterns, as shown in Tab. 4.2 where
three “data clearinghouse” examples are among the worst domains.
• Problematic users : Abusive accounts are not uncommon. Our corpus identifies
50+ users adding 10+ spam instances, a majority of which were blocked for
their actions. Moreover, the usernames associated with abusive accounts were
often indicative of a conflict-of-interest (COI) (i.e., the username matches the
domain name, verbatim).
More surprising than the behaviors we do observe are those we do not. With En-
glish Wikipedia receiving 8.5 billion page views per month we expected to see more
blatantly commercial spam,4 abuse of the modification permission, and use of mech-
anized scripts. However, it appears that link spammers exhibit sophistication not
in technical dimensions but through subtlety and social engineering. By following
4Just because a site is not directly commercial does not mean there are no economics, profit,
or strong incentive involved. With sufficient traffic, ad revenue could be a significant monetary
motivation. Moreover, it is impossible to quantify ideological and narcissistic effects.
39
DOMAIN SPAM-# TOTAL-# SPAM-%
www.youtube.com 101 3156 3.2%
Area code look-up 72 83 86.7%
www.facebook.com 48 3200 1.5%
Cinematic rankings 41 49 83.6%
www.billboard.com 35 1346 2.6%
Soccer statistics 29 36 80.5%
Table 4.2: Domains w/most spam occurrences in corpus collection; note
that non-spam labels are not an endorsement of link quality (Sec. 5.3.1).
Some domains are not made explicit because: (1) they are not well
known and (2) to avoid additional exposure.
linking conventions they may be hopeful their links will evade (or at least, delay)
detection and can persist on articles and derive long term utility.5 Our insights into
the human review of spam in Sec. 5.3.1 and Sec. 6.4 find a conservative labeling
bias, i.e., frequent uncertainty over quality result in in link survival. Even if a link
is flagged by a human, the fact perpetrators have followed conventions may lessen
punitive action or prevent audits of the URL history. Since these subtleties affect
human labeling, they also influence our corpus composition of Sec. 5.3.1.
Malicious attackers are able to blend in with those who spam out of policy ig-
norance, and threads on blackhat and spam forums discuss how to leverage this
ambiguity. The mere existence of “ignorant” spammers (i.e., those conducting spam
behaviors absent malice and/or an understanding of link policy) speaks to the novel
socio-technical configuration of open collaboration applications. It is difficult to
imagine a small business owner unknowingly launching a botnet scale email attack.
Lower social barriers-to-entry often imply lowered technical barriers as well, enabling
misuse by a class of less sophisticated abusers.
Acute instances: External to our corpus and its two month collection, an on-wiki
project dedicated to anti-spam efforts is one of the best historical resources regarding
5An alternative school of thought is to spam aggressively and maximize resource utilization in
the finite window until detection takes place, one we describe further in Sec. 7.2.
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persistent attacks of scale [18]. It should be noted that the full scope of many of
these incidents (about 100 are reported monthly) is only realized in hindsight.
One case is remarkable for exemplifying the technical vulnerability that Wikipedia
does face: “Generic Chinese Knockoff Spam”. GCKS is an outfit peddling counter-
feit luxury and designer goods, and in 1.5 years it/they have conducted 65+ spam
campaigns on English Wikipedia utilizing 300+ domains (see our aggregate report
at [148]). The destination sites are template-driven interfaces into a single affiliate
transaction processing network (i.e., infrastructure similar to that of sophisticated
email spam attacks [91]). More than 3500+ domains have been proactively black-
listed based on the unique signature(s) of this template. The outfit targets multiple
language editions of Wikipedia using IP addresses primarily from a single Chinese
province. Spam tactics range from blatant to subtle, and anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that this is human-driven “sweatshop spam”. In the global landscape of spam
behaviors this is not a terribly interesting instance, but it serves as a cautionary
example that Wikipedia is not immune to such attacks. However, unlike most other
environments, a lack of automated anti-spam defenses for open collaboration means
mitigating these recurring instances has been a tremendous human burden.
Our two month corpus collection (see Sec. 5.3.1) does capture multiple GCKS
instances (recall the attack has been ongoing for 1.5 years), yet acute strategies such
as these form an overwhelming minority of that corpus and the problem space.
Related work shortcomings: While one should remain mindful of the potential
for massive commercial attacks like GCKS, they are simply not prevalent in the status
quo. However, the absence of direct monetary incentives in no way simplifies the
detection task. Quite the opposite, this renders ineffective those approaches that
quantify a landing site’s “commercial intention” (per Sec. 3.2). Language model
disagreement, the most predominant anti-spam mechanism used with commenting
functionality, also fails given a lack of blanket spamming tactics and computationally
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authored link placement. Remarkably, even when “male enhancement” pharmacies
spam Wikipedia they only target those articles relevant to their landing site.
Moving forward: Fortunately, our measurement study suggests novel ways to
approach the problem, tactics leveraged in Sec. 5.3.2. Link spam is a subset of
vandalism so it is intuitive to reuse the features developed for that purpose. However
there is also the opportunity to extend reputation and metadata techniques into
the spam/URL space. When historical feedback is sparse internally, Internet scale
reputation metrics (e.g., Pagerank [106]) can indicate whether a resource is trusted
on a more global scale. Other takeaway properties include: (1) many spam accounts
are single purpose in nature, (2) bursty additions of a URL/domain are suspicious,
and (3) URLs/domains that that have little author diversity tend to be problematic.
4.1.3 Privacy and Liability
Motivations: When conducting security audits into vandalism and spam instances
we discovered that certain events had gone “missing” with their details removed
from public view. Subsequent investigation would reveal that such redaction func-
tionality exists to protect the legal and safety interests of Wikipedia and its user
base. The need for such actions is not just precautionary, as the encyclopedia has
been threatened with litigation for copyright issues [97], accused of hosting child
pornography [149], and blacklisted in some regions for content issues [53]. In turn
this sparks curiosity about what gets redacted, how often it occurs, how reactive the
host is to these threats, and what behaviors most endanger Wikipedia.
Characterization: A functionality available only to Wikipedia administrators is
used to redact content from public view (RevDelete [19]). We concern ourselves only
with actions taken via that tool, where non-administrators can request its use via
out-of-band channels. The tool operates at revision granularity and is distinct from
42
Figure 4.3: Example page history w/redaction
the article deletion process [118, 128] (which occurs for less acute reasons). A deleted
revision cannot be publicly viewed or diff’ed against, and Fig. 4.3 shows an example
redaction in a revision history. Administrators are able to audit the deletions of
others and suppression functionality elevates this to an even more exclusive set of
users. The tool operates only over textual content and while multiple fields can be
deleted (see Tab. 4.4) we are concerned primarily with content issues.
Tab. 4.3 and the Wikipedia policy page [19] display the criteria that justify
the use of redaction/suppression. These rational are quite opaque and we sought to
characterize and quantify actual deletion cases. Using a technique we describe further
in [144] we stored every edit to Wikipedia in near real time. Then, public log data
and exhaustive API requests reveal revisions which were subsequently deleted. A
manual/qualitative analysis allows us to expand on the official “reason for deletion”
(RD) criteria and make explicit the liability/privacy issue that each addresses:
• RD1: Copyright violations have obvious legal ramifications. In practice these
revisions are exclusively large text insertions where that content has been copy-
pasted from another online source.
• RD2: More than simple vandalism, “grossly insulting” deletions tend to ad-
dress possible libel/slander claims. Revisions often make realistic but unsub-
stantiated claims regarding promiscuity, pedophilia, and other crimes. Gener-
ally an identifiable individual (i.e., full names) is mentioned. Extreme instances
of racist and profane hate speech are also removed under this criteria.
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ID DESCRIPTION
RD1 Blatant copyright violation
RD2 Grossly insulting/offensive
RD3 Purely disruptive material
RD4 Revision pending “SUPP”
RD5 Other valid deletion
RD6 Non-contentious housekeeping
SUPP Privacy violations
Table 4.3: Redaction criteria
REDACTED NUM %
content 13616 72.0%
summary 4082 21.6%
user 832 0.8%
combinations 377 5.6%
TOTAL 18907 100.0%
Table 4.4: Fields redacted
• RD3: Disruptive acts could affect system operation and removing them from
public view might prevent copycat attacks and/or minimize threats to platform
security. In practice these were similar to RD2 cases. No evidence of creative,
sophisticated, or large scale vulnerabilities was found in our collection.
• RD4+: RD4 is never cited explicitly (this would draw unnecessary attention
to pending “suppression” cases). RD5 and RD6 seem to be precautionary
“catch alls” that are unfocused and virtually unused in practice.
• Suppression: This stronger form of deletion is used to remove “non-public
identifying information”, i.e., edits containing individual’s addresses, phone
numbers, contact information, or the IP addresses of registered users.
Our review found no evidence to suggest that redaction was occurring for reasons of
administrative self interest or censorship.
Measurement: We now present prevalence and impact statistics for redaction ac-
tions, summarizing our prior measurement study [144]. A prominent theme is that
copyright violation cases (RD1) are uniquely problematic given their damage is not
surface level and extrinsic to the typical review process.
During our year long study some 60,000 revisions were redacted (roughly 45
million edits were made to English Wikipedia in the same period [22]). This is a
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MO RD1 RD2 RD3 RD4+ OTH SUM SUPP
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
Jul. 88 718 1695 6 158 2665 658
Aug. 167 840 103 51 313 1474 287
Sep. 129 1846 161 18 193 2347 338
Oct. 252 5067 179 19 165 5682 557
Nov. 1087 535 112 14 215 1963 492
Dec. 338 323 152 84 352 1249 487
YEAR 2146 11021 3853 235 1652 18907 5593
Table 4.5: Redaction prevalence by rationale; suppression cases are
counted separately due to differing measurement methodology [144]
lower bound on the prevalence of eligible cases, as many instances have likely been
reverted deep into the obscurity of revision histories. Regardless, analyzing redaction
in terms of raw revision quantity is not ideal. Imagine rn introduces dangerous
content. Subsequent revisions rn+1 . . . rn+x are constructive but do not remove the
threat. When the damage is discovered all edits back to rn will need to be redacted
because the threat persists through them, collateral damage of an earlier offense.
This underscores why incident level analysis is more intuitive. Such grouping is
straightforward for publicly logged redactions, whereby simultaneously deleted edits
are assigned the same identifier. Suppressed portions are privately logged so we
assume adjacent suppressed revisions are part of the same incident. For the roughly
60k revision redactions some 24,500 incidents were identified (Tab. 4.5). While 89%
of these have just one revision, copyright related incidents average 12.5 revisions.
Some copyright incidents persist over several hundred revisions. Repairing deep
damage is problematic given that one must painstakingly parse out violating text in
spite of subsequent modifications. In a late 2010 incident a prolific copyright violator
was discovered who had significantly altered 23,000+ articles over several years [25].
Several thousand articles were blanked in lieu of trying to identify offending articles
and textual fragments therein.
Tab. 4.5 plots the relative frequency of incidents by reason for deletion, with
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Figure 4.4: Active duration of redacted incidents
insulting/disruptive (61%), privacy cases (23%), and copyright violations (9%) fig-
uring most prominently. Prominence, however, is a poor measure of vulnerability
and impact. To this end we consider an incident’s active duration: the time interval
in which the damage was visible in the most recent article version (a metric explored
further in Sec. 6.1 and plotted for other damage types in Fig. 6.1). Note that active
duration is terminated by a simple revert irregardless of how long it may take an
administrator to respond and formally redact the incident. Fig. 4.4 plots the CDF
of active duration for copyright incidents against those redacted for other reasons.
This confirms the latency of identifying copyright cases. Whereas non-copyright lia-
bility/privacy cases are active for only 1.6 minutes at median, copyright ones survive
for 3.8 days. The upper quartile of instances have an active lifetime of 110+ days
and suggests there might be many instances still live on the encyclopedia.
Related work & moving forward: Our study revealed that nearly 90% of pri-
vacy/liability cases are an acute subset of vandalism, exhibiting characteristic prop-
erties of the parent class (profanity, disruption, etc.). Thus, existing anti-vandal
logic along with our improvements of the next chapter are well positioned to revert
these cases (although a human is needed for formal redaction). When autonomous
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Figure 4.5: Example diff between revisions
methods fall short this is still damage humans can readily identify.
The same cannot be said for the detection of copyright instances, a field for
which related literature is extremely sparse. Others do recognize the problem: Cha
et al. [40] quantifies YouTube’s video deletions for copyright reasons, and Google
penalizes the search engine ranking of sites that are issued “take down” notices [66].
However, these actions are reactive to the claims of copyright holders. Our work
towards proactive discovery in Sec. 5.4.1 and [20] appears academically novel.
4.2 Human Mitigation
Focus now turns to the human mitigation which complements those portions of the
problem space not handled autonomously. We begin by describing the “base case”
defense model, one that captures how Wikipedia’s content security has self-organized
using only the core capabilities of the platform (Sec. 4.2.1). This is not a model
dictated by software but a fluid ecosystem of users fulfilling security roles at will.
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Figure 4.6: Damage detection pipeline for human mitigation
This model is an imperfect one, both in design and practice. We argue that current
approaches are the source of redundant and inefficient mitigation work. Moreover,
security extensions have done little to address these shortcomings (Sec. 4.2.2).
4.2.1 Base Case Defense Model
The defense ecosystem of Wikipedia is one best described at two granularity. First,
we describe how single instances of damage are discovered. Then, we discuss how
these discoveries aggregate into block actions and broader security investigations.
Single instance discovery: Virtually all security these reviews occur by examin-
ing the diff it produces. Fig. 4.5 shows an example diff, which visually represents
all document additions, deletions, and reorganizations. Their use is unremarkable,
although there may be social engineering ramifications in how they are interpreted.
More interesting is how one selects the revisions they review. We describe this pro-
cess as a pipeline, visualized in Fig. 4.6:
• Patrollers: Assuming an edit is not autonomously blocked, patrollers are
the first line of human defense. This is a role whereby one performs brute
force inspections over a list of recent changes without regard for subject mat-
ter. These lists often include simple metadata features which patrollers use to
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prioritize their reviews, typically focusing on unregistered users or those who
do not leave edit summaries. These lists grow/scroll extremely quickly, on the
order of several edits per second for English Wikipedia.
• Watchlisters: Users utilize watchlists to indicate documents of interest.
When an article on one’s watchlist is edited they can receive notification in
numerous forms. We presume a watchlister has some incentive to ensure these
changes are beneficial and therefore serve a reactive security role. Watchlist
summaries extend out several days, but it is not unusual for dedicated editors
to have watchlists containing 1000+ articles.
• Readers: Damage evading the previous stages is said to be embedded on
the article. Now, only readers are likely to encounter the damage. A reader
may identify but choose not to undo the damage for reasons of apathy or
unfamiliarity with the editing system. Anecdotal evidence suggests casual
readers are extremely unlikely to fix the problem [31].
When a damaging edit is identified it is removed with a revert action. This revert may
itself be audited along the same workflow, although revisions showing this signature
(i.e., an edit summary indicating a revert) tend to attract less scrutiny.
Aggregate mitigation: When damage is discovered perpetrators should be issued
a warning on their public discussion page. Subsequent warnings escalate in severity
as shown in Fig. 4.7. Extensive template based warnings are given to accommodate
ignorant users and concerns over editor retention [73]. If these are not heeded a
user should file a block request on an administrative noticeboard. Blocks tend to
be permanent for registered accounts but temporary for IP-based ones (in case of
DHCP). In the base case every stage of the process is manually undertaken.
Damage discovery broader than the account level is less structured. Users may
create Sybil [52] or sock-puppet accounts to evade blocks. Manual signature detection
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Figure 4.7: Warning hierarchy for damage perpetrators
and probable cause is typically required to access the IP data needed to corroborate
these suspicions. When substantiated, single or entire ranges of IP addresses may
lose editing and/or account creation privileges (including famously, the Church of
Scientology [92] and U.S. Capitol [24]). There is little protection against damaging
collectives not confined to a well defined IP range, although a best effort is made to
proactively block known proxy and Tor nodes.
All types of damage are mitigated in this fashion. Spam defense adds an admin-
istratively controlled URL blacklist and the ability to search by URL.
4.2.2 Inefficiencies and Available Tools
The aforementioned model is not an ideal or efficient one. While we are able to pro-
duce quantified metrics that evaluate human response (as done in Sec. 6.1) these are
unbounded and relativistic measures that say little about the potential for improve-
ment. Instead, this is a claim we defend by demonstrating logical inefficiencies. The
absence of functionality to rectify these shortcomings is influential in the design of
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our own human mitigation tool in Chap. 6. While there are software tools extending
base platform functionality, these offer only incremental improvements.
Missing functionality: Simple logic combined with our Wikipedia experience al-
lows us to characterize five shortcomings of the human mitigation infrastructure:
1. Redundant review: A single revision can be be needlessly re-reviewed. Poor
edits are “explicitly guilty” in that a revert action logs their discovery. How-
ever, an “implicit innocence” exists as constructive revisions persist with no
annotation of inspection. All active patrollers might review a revision followed
by many watchlisters (“Benjamin Franklin” has ≈850 watchers). On popular
pages more than 1000 reviews could take place for a single innocent edit. This
does not imply a single review can completely vet an edit, but one or two “no
action” reviews – if annotated and performed by trusted users – would nearly
eliminate the chance the revision is blatant damage.
2. Simultaneous work: A subcase of redundant review occurs when two or
more users are reviewing an edit at the same time. This is not uncommon given
patroller competition for “low hanging fruit” and can lead to edit conflicts
if multiple user’s inspections overlap. Such competition can also rush user
judgement out of fear someone else will get credit for the discovery/revert.
3. Incomplete coverage: Some edits receive no review whatsoever. With
English Wikipedia averaging 1.5 edits/sec. and sustained peak loads of 10+
edits/sec. it is infeasible that any one patroller could exhaustively vet new
content [22]. Moreover, decentralized patrollers often apply the same crude
prioritization criteria (e.g., focusing on edits by unregistered users), creating
non-uniform patrol patterns that are easily gamed. One should also consider
there are times where there are no patrollers, allowing even obvious damage to
filter to the watchlist level, where some articles have no watchlisters.
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4. Näıve prioritization: When a patroller/watchlister decides which edits to
review this is done primarily based on the minimal metadata presented along-
side edit lists. Meanwhile, there are complex computation mechanisms com-
puting fine grained and multi-variate vandalism probabilities to determine if
automatic reversion should take place. The failure to convey these probabili-
ties for human use is clearly a missed opportunity to intelligently route actors
and improve capture rates.
5. Compiling human latency: Despite having a relative degree of structure
the warning/blocking process is still a manual one. Not only must humans
know what action to take (e.g., “readers” who discover damage may be un-
aware of these mechanisms) but the time they invest in performing them is
non-trivial. This would be time better spent reviewing other edits, and the
combined latency of these actions extends the lifetime of malicious accounts.
Software editing assistants: In order to improve Wikipedia’s mitigation ecosys-
tem several scripts/tools provide functionality beyond that of the base platform (in-
terfacing via the API). Numerous tools exist: Igloo, AutoWikiBrowser, and Twinkle
– but most popular and representative among these is Huggle [16, 60]. Traditional
patrol involves using a web browser and refreshing the “recent changes” list. Tools
like Huggle connect to a live IRC feed of changes and provide an interface to quickly
iterate through revision diffs. Damage can be undone in a single click and logic can
automatically place the appropriate warning or file a block request.
While this approach improves throughput it only addresses deficiency #5 above.
These purely client-side tools lack the centralized or P2P communication needed to
eliminate issues #1-3. Moreover, the tools have made only incremental steps towards
improved prioritization (#4) by codifying the primitive heuristics used by manual
reviewers. Overall, current anti-vandal tools tend to make the act of reviewing
quicker for individuals but lack the primitives to coordinate a distributed workforce.
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Chapter 5
Improving Computational
Detection
The measurement studies of the prior chapter identified shortcomings of existing
damage detection approaches. Learning from those we now develop novel techniques
that complement or extend that prior work. The goal is a simple one: to classify
damaging revisions as accurately as possible. We begin by discussing the metrics
used to evaluate effectiveness (Sec. 5.1). Then, methods are described for vandalism
(Sec. 5.2) and spam (Sec. 5.3) detection, evaluating them over English Wikipedia.
Finally, the portability of these techniques is demonstrated by showing them effective
across a diverse set of use cases (Sec. 5.4).
5.1 Evaluation Metrics
The damage classifiers we develop in this chapter are evaluated against labeled cor-
pora of “damage” and “not damage” instances. As such, standard information-
retrieval metrics are appropriate for evaluating system performance [61]. Due to
class imbalance and other factors of the Wikipedia specific task Potthast [113] and
others [68] argue that precision-recall (PR) curves are the preferable approach and
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we follow this suggestion. Intuitively, recall is the portion of the problem space a
solution covers (a percentage of damage), where precision is how accurate it is over
that portion (related to, but not the complement of the false positive (FP) rate).6
As recall increases precision will decrease (i.e., as one wants to identify a greater
percentage of damage one must predict more “difficult” cases, and will therefore
make more mis-predictions). Looking forward, Fig. 5.4 plots one example. We are
interested in two metrics gleamed from a classifier’s precision-recall (PR) curve.
First, when considering the autonomous reversion of damage from Wikipedia
(“bot operation”) one must be sensitive to the number of errors such a system will
make. Wikipedia’s most prominent anti-vandalism bot [36] has secured community
approval to operate at a precision as low as 0.943, corresponding to a 0.25% false
positive (FP) rate. Based on this we consider a 0.95 precision to be the threshold
for bot operation. That is if a classifier has 0.30 recall at 0.95 precision then 30% of
the vandalism problem can be handled without human intervention.
Second, even when the probability/score a classifier generates is not high enough
to qualify for automatic reversion, it still has predictive value. To capture this notion
over the entirety of the problem space we use the area under the (precision recall)
curve (PR-AUC) metric. This is a reduction of the entire curve into a single intuitive
and quantified measure, whose maximum area is 1.0.
5.2 Vandalism Detection
The first target for computational improvement is the broadest set of damage, van-
dalism. We establish the corpora used for analysis and evaluation (Sec. 5.2.1) before
6As a more formal explanation: Assume an oracle, O, has a set of edits, E, with subsets labeled
as damage, Ed, and not-damage, En. O gives these edits without labels to a classifier, C, that
runs its logic and sorts edits based on prediction confidence. Then, C goes in order (starting
with its most confident prediction) broadcasting predictions. After each prediction O can plot
two quantities: (1) Recall : of all |Ed| edits, the percentage that C has predicted. (2) Precision:
percentage of the time C has predicted damage and been correct in that prediction.
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describing our novel contributions. These focus on reputation (Sec. 5.2.2) and meta-
data (Sec. 5.2.3) techniques. When this strategy is evaluated in combination with
existing techniques its effectiveness is validated given the significant advancement of
anti-vandalism benchmarks (Sec. 5.2.4).
5.2.1 Data Sets
Prior to late 2010, corpora for vandalism tended to be extremely small [123], non-
representative, and/or had weakly defined notions of “non-vandalism” [142]. Though
some of our early feature development is based atop these datasets, our core eval-
uation uses the PAN-WVC-10 corpus [110] which has become authoritative in the
field. The corpus contains ≈32,000 randomly selected English Wikipedia revisions (a
2011 extension adds 10,000 more [111]) with 7% being vandalism, matching research
estimates of vandalism prevalence. Tagging was outsourcing to Amazon Mechanical
Turk where multiple workers reviewed each edit and only those with strong consensus
were included in the final set.
The tool we construct in Sec. 6.3 has also produced 1.1+ million classifications
by Wikipedia experts. While not representative for training purposes the breadth of
this set does inform observations about vandal behavior.
5.2.2 Reputation Features
Our measurement study analysis (Sec. 4.1.1) of existing reputation mechanisms
(Sec. 3.1.3) revealed sparse behavioral histories to be a serious drawback. Towards
remedying this we develop the notion of spatial reputation and apply it not just to
users, but also to system artifacts.
Gleaning feedback: Reputation algorithms aggregate behavioral observations (i.e.,
feedback) to compute quantified and predictive values. Adler’s work [27, 29] showed
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that feedback could be implicitly gleaned based on the survival of individual lan-
guage/content tokens. This proves unnecessarily fine grained for our analysis, which
seeks to aggregate unary observations (i.e., “was this revision damage?”). Producing
such feedback is equivalent to the detection of vandalism with hindsight [28, 143]and
tends to be a refinement on locating previously reverted edits.
A straightforward way to find revert instances is to compute the hash codes of
article content. If hash(rn) = hash(rn−2) then revision rn−1 is an identity revert [54].
In [142] we showed that edit summaries could also be parsed to detect reverts with
the added benefits of: (1) not having to obtain/hash article content, (2) allowing
one to distinguish reverts made for reasons of blatant damage, and (3) trusting
the accuracy of those actions. Specialized machinery called rollback is available
only to trusted users, expressly for expediting non-controversial revert actions. The
functionality leaves a standardized edit summary which when cross-checked with
user permissions is an efficient and robust means to produce feedback. Prior work
has established that such feedback (and therefore reputation) is not terribly latent:
at median, revert actions performed by humans come 90 seconds after the reverted
edit [142] and are nearly instantaneous for bot reverts.
Spatial reputation: Provided feedback, there are plentiful ways to aggregate those
observations into an entity granularity (i.e., editor) reputation [84]. Herein we pur-
posefully select a simple algorithm in order to highlight our contributions in the
spatial dimension. As formalized below, every feedback event mapping to an entity
results in a penalty for that entity’s reputation. The penalty’s weight is determined
by a time decay function. The overall reputation is the sum of all timed decayed
events in the the feedback history.
Such reputations must be interpreted relatively, there is no ceiling on poor be-
havior. We initialize new users to have zero reputation, although one could imagine
seeding new user histories with feedback events to dis-incentivize Sybil attacks (we
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capture these notions in other features). Reputation improves only along temporal
terms, there is no notion of a “good edit”, and no normalization based on edit rate.
This prevents ballot stuffing and recognizes that blatant damage is an act committed
with intent, not an accidental consequence of performing many edits.
Such methods yield no predictive intelligence for users without feedback history,
the “cold start problem”. While constructive users may have no feedback events,
consistent and long term participation tends to make their reputations irrelevant.
Instead, it is the lack of information regarding new users which is the crux of the
problem. To counter this we developed the notion of spatial reputation [138], an over-
lay model that makes use of existing reputation algorithms. The idea is to establish
spatial grouping functions over entities. In a geographical dimension one might imag-
ine functions that given some entity will return: (1) the entity itself, (2) entities in
the same city, and (3) entities in the same state. One can compute group reputations
by normalizing the reputations of all group members. Then, an aggregate function is
applied that can compensate for partial information. If one has much entity specific
information then that should be weighted heavily. However, if that proves sparse,
then one can default to broader groupings for predictive intelligence. We utilize
Subjective Logic [83] atop standard machine learning techniques.
Spatial associations may be defined along geography, graph topologies, member-
ship functions, or anywhere a distance function can be defined. Of course, these
groupings/dimensions must capture behavioral tendencies in order to be meaning-
ful. Fortunately, the sociological principal of homophily – the notion that those who
share characteristics tend to associate – has been found to hold true in a tremen-
dous number of settings [96]. This is not a guarantee that every member shares
group properties, only a probabilistic likelihood that leveraging spatial information
will outperform random chance. In many ways the technique is a statistical for-
malization of criminal profiling tactics, also inheriting its ethical contentions. Prior
work [138] expands on grouping strategies to prevent gamesmanship.
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Formalizing reputation: A feedback history, H = {f1, f2 . . . fn} contains feed-
back events, fx = (ex, tfback), where ex is the set of entities to which the feedback
maps and tfback is the timestamp of the observed behavior. Note that only a single
class of feedback is supported. From this we define two functions:
• fback hist(g,H) – given a set of entities, g, and a feedback history, H, the
function returns all feedback timestamps fx.tfback where fx ∈ H and ∃y ∈ g
where y ∈ fx.ex. Informally, we return the timestamps of all feedback events
in which some member of g was involved.
• decay(t, h) – calculate time decay. We use decay(t) = 2−∆t/h where ∆t =
(tnow − t) and h is the half-life.
Now assume one wishes to calculate the reputation of entity α in the context of a
spatial grouping function G such that G(α) = g where g is a set of entities in which
α is a member. We can calculate the reputation of this spatial grouping to be:
rep(g = G(α), h,H) =
∑
tfback∈
fback hist(g,H)
decay(tfback, h)
|g|
(5.1)
All rep() values calculated using the same G() and H are strictly comparable (i.e.,
can be relatively interpreted). It is expected one will define multiple grouping func-
tions G1, G2 . . . Gn, thereby enabling the calculation of n reputation values for an
entity α, namely rep(G1(α), ·) . . . rep(Gn(α), ·) for aggregation purposes.
Application to users: When assigning reputation to Wikipedia users we consider
two groupings: (1) the user his/herself (i.e., G(α) = g = α, and |g| = 1) and (2) the
geographic country to which that user’s IP address geolocates. The existence of
habitual offenders is an underlying assumption of all reputation systems and one
previously attempted on Wikipedia [30]. Our single entity user reputations perform
similarly well and need not be discussed at length.
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RANK COUNTRY EDITS %-VAND
1 Italy 116,659 2.85%
2 France 116,201 3.46%
3 Germany 227,037 3.46%
. . . . . . . . . . . .
12 Canada 989,857 11.35%
13 United States 7,648,075 11.63%
14 Australia 670,483 12.08%
Table 5.1: Normalized vandalism occurence rate by geolocated country
of unregistered editors; only countries w/100k+ edits in corpus of [142]
are included. Australia is not 12% of the total vandalism problem; 12%
of edits from Australia are vandalism.
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Figure 5.1: Precision-recall graph showing combined and isolated per-
formance of component reputations for Wikipedia users
However, we find roughly 40% of the time a new/unregistered user vandalizes
they had rep(·) = 0. In these cases spatial expansion into the user-country dimen-
sion proves helpful (registered users, a small fraction of the vandalism problem, are
mapped to their own “country”). Tab. 5.1 shows editors from certain countries tend
to show a propensity towards damaging behavior. For example, an Australian edit is
4× more likely to be vandalism than one from Italy. Regardless the social reasoning
the statistical gap is significant.
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ARTICLE #VAND ARTICLE #VAND
George W. Bush 6546 World War II 1886
Wikipedia 5589 Jesus Christ 1681
Adolf Hitler 2612 George Washington 1648
United States 2161 Bill Clinton 1594
Table 5.2: Most vandalized Wikipedia articles, pre-2010 [142]
While both user and user-country reputation are useful metrics it is their combi-
nation to assess a single revision which is most interesting, with Fig. 5.1 displaying
the results. For 25% of the recall space it is user specific reputation which is most
effective predictor, yet the remaining 75% is better handled by the broader metric.
When machine learning with confidence coefficients is brought to bear an aggre-
gate metric (“combined”) combines this evidence and significantly outperforms the
component measures (using PR-AUC).
Subsequent investigation has revealed intermediate granularity groupings based
on IP subnets (e.g., /24 CIDRs) would also be beneficial. This would allow the
capture of DHCP hopping vandals and the educational institutions known to be a
significant part of the vandalism problem.
Application to artifacts: Assessing article reputation is an approach not seen
previously in literature, and we consider not just articles directly but extend this
spatially to include the topical categories they are members of.
Certain topics are inherently controversial and see frequent vandalism (e.g., re-
ligious and ethical issues). Others incur temporally variable abuse (e.g., political
candidates near elections). Article reputation is well equipped to handle both cases.
This succeeds because of the non-uniform distribution of damage that Tab. 5.2 makes
apparent.7 When computed, article reputation is 4× higher on average for vandalism
7These should not be interpreted as the “most controversial” articles. Administrators can protect
articles to prevent them from being edited by users of varying permissions, limiting their damage.
In practice, such protection is rare and is a practical security tradeoff discussed further in Sec. 7.1.3.
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CATEGORY (w/100+ pages) PGs VANDs/PG
World Music Award Winners 125 162.27
Characters of Les Misérables 135 146.88
Former British Colonies 145 141.51
Congressional Medal Recipients 161 121.98
Table 5.3: Most vandalized Wikipedia categories (normalized) [142]
edits than non-damaging ones. Additionally, nearly 85% of vandalism instances have
non-zero article reputations compared to 45% for innocent edits [142].
Leveraging topical category reputation as a spatial grouping over articles also
proves helpful (see the least reputable categories in Tab. 5.3). Identifying 250,000
topical categories, we calculate the reputations for all of an article’s category mem-
berships and select the worst reputation as the feature value. Of vandalism edits, 97%
have non-zero reputations (compared to 85% in the article case), again demonstrat-
ing larger spatial contexts generate more evidence [142]. Manual inspection shows
categories most useful when an article experiences a sudden rise to prominence. For
example, breaking news stories are often added to a poorly reputed category (e.g.,
“Deaths in 2013”) and this addition foreshadows coming damage that has not yet
been experienced at the article level.
5.2.3 Metadata Features
Our measurement study of existing metadata strategies (Sec. 4.1.1) found them
underdeveloped, not optimized for revision granularity, and primarily content de-
pendent. Here we develop over two dozen metadata features that address these
shortcomings. Three themes are emphasized: (1) spatio-temporal patterns, (2) par-
ticipatory dynamics, and (3) artifact maturation. In the interest of brevity we con-
centrate on describing these themes rather than the rote justification of individual
features (as done previously [28, 142, 143]). A comprehensive listing of features is
found in Tab. 5.4 (the “M” entries) and Tab. 5.5.
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Figure 5.2: Vandalism prevalence
by day-of-week
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Figure 5.3: Vandalism prevalence
by hour-of-day
Spatio-temporal metadata: Just as reputations of the previous section dynami-
cally interpreted spatio-temporal aspects, one can identify static metadata features
of the same type. This is motivated by Hao et al. [75] who showed spatial (e.g.,
artifact sizes) and temporal (e.g., time-of-day) notions effective against email spam.
Many of these features are also remarkable in their simplicity and predictiveness
while remaining content agnostic. We highlight several such features:
• Time-of-day and day-of-week: Using geolocation we determine the GMT
offset of an editor and determine the local time-of-day (Fig. 5.2) and day-
of-week (Fig. 5.3) when an edit was committed. Besides following circadian
patterns [154] we recognize that most vandalism happens on weekdays during
“business hours”. We attribute this to primary/secondary school students
using institutional access to vandalize [145].
• Size ratio: When comparing the size of a new artifact to the previous ver-
sion, vandalism edits overwhelmingly come in two forms: (1) massive content
removal in the form of section/article blanking, and (2) minor content additions
of less than 100 bytes. There is little incentive for vandals to spend considerable
effort on their damage given the likelihood it will quickly be undone.
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FEATURE CLS SRC DESCRIPTION
IS REGISTERED M [V,A,W] Whether editor is anonymous/registered (boolean)
COMMENT LENGTH M [V,A,W] Length (in chars) of revision comment left
SIZE CHANGE M [V,A,W] Size difference between prev. and current versions
TIME SINCE PAGE M [A,W] Time since article (of edit) last modified
TIME OF DAY M [A,W] Time when edit made (UTC, or local w/geolocation)
DAY OF WEEK M [W] Local day-of-week when edit made, per geolocation
TIME SINCE REG M [W] Time since editor’s first Wikipedia edit
TIME SINCE VAND M [W] Time since editor last caught vandalizing
REP EDITOR R [W] Reputation for editor via behavior history
REP COUNTRY R [W] Reputation for geographical region (editor groups)
REP ARTICLE R [W] Reputation for article (on which edit was made)
REP CATEGORY R [W] Reputation for topical category (article groups)
WIKITRUST R [A] Multiple features speaking to author’s content-persistence
DIGIT RATIO L [V] Ratio of numerical chars. to all chars.
ALPHANUM RATIO L [V] Ratio of alpha-numeric chars. to all chars.
UPPER RATIO L [V] Ratio of uppercase chars. to all chars.
UPPER RATIO OLD L [V] Ratio of uppercase chars. to lowercase chars.
LONG CHAR SEQ L [V] Length of longest consecutive sequence of single char.
LONG WORD L [V] Length of longest token
NEW TERM FREQ L [V] Average relative frequency of inserted words
COMPRESS LZW L [V] Compression rate of inserted text, per LZW
CHAR DIST L [V] Kullback-Leibler divergence of char. distribution
VULGARITY S [V] Freq./impact of vulgar and offensive words
PRONOUNS S [V] Freq./impact of first and second person pronouns
BIASED WORDS S [V] Freq./impact of colloquial words w/high bias
SEXUAL WORDS S [V] Freq./impact of non-vulgar sex-related words
MISC BAD WORDS S [V] Freq./impact of miscellaneous typos/colloquialisms
ALL BAD WORDS S [V] Freq./impact of previous five factors in combination
GOOD WORDS S [V] Freq./impact of “good words”; wiki-syntax elements
COMM REVERT S [A] Is rev. comment indicative of a revert? (boolean)
Table 5.4: Listing of features in combined vandalism evaluation [28], by
class: M=metadata, R=reputation, L=lexical, S=semantic. Sourcing
column is: V(elasco)=[130], A(dler)=[30], W(est)=[142].
• Edit summary length: Whether due to laziness or unfamiliarity with com-
munity conventions roughly 40% of vandalism leaves no summary. Comments
left with vandalism are 43% the size of those for non-damaging edits.
Participatory dynamics and artifact maturation: Metadata features captur-
ing entity age, interaction density, and evolution can contextualize and complement
the behavioral reputations we previously described. Tab. 5.5 contains many of these
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FEATURE DESCRIPTION
USR IS BOT Whether the editor has the “bot” flag (i.e., non-human user)
USR BLK BEFORE Whether the editor has been blocked at any point in the past
USR PG SIZE Size, in bytes, of the editor’s “user talk” page
USR EDITS * Editor’s revisions in last, t ∈ {hour, day, week,month, ever}
USR EDITS DENSE Normalizing USR EDITS EVER by account age
USR PREV IP Whether the previous editor of the article was IP/anonymous
USR PREV SAME Whether the previous article editor is same as current editor
ART AGE Time, in seconds, since the article was created
ART EDITS * Article revisions in last, t ∈ {hour, day, week,month, ever}
ART EDITS DENSE Normalizing ART EDITS EVER by ART AGE
ART POPULARITY Number of views the article has recently received (Sec. 6.1)
ART SIZE Size, in bytes, of article after the edit under inspection was made
ART CHURN CHARS Quantity of characters added or removed by edit
ART CHURN BLKS Quantity of non-adjacent text blocks modified by edit
COMM HAS SEC Whether the comment indicates the edit was “section specific”
COMM LEN NO SEC Length, in chars., of the comment w/o auto-added section header
Table 5.5: Additional anti-vandalism features introduced in [143]
features (introduced primarily in [143]) and we discuss they distinctions they enable:
• User dynamics: It is intuitive that registered, long term, and active contrib-
utors are rarely vandals. Indeed, the median age of registered accounts who
vandalize is just 1.6 hours. Unregistered users are frequent perpetrators, but
IP addresses showing consistent participation and favorable reputation can be
shown less scrutiny. Erratic and bursty participation (captured by usage his-
tograms) from unregistered users is typical of shared use settings (e.g., school
computer labs) and these IP based accounts often have block histories and
frequent talk page warnings. Isolated mis-behavior in the distant past needs
treated more cautiously due to possible DHCP considerations.
• Article evolution: Features gleaned from articles benefit from the persis-
tence of those artifacts. Older and often edited articles tend to have stable
content. This makes revisions with large content churn suspicious, especially
by new editors. Popular articles are often damaged but this is unsurprising
given that every article viewer is a potential vandal. Consider that one’s ar-
rival at obscure articles often implies biased interest, as articles for secondary
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schools are among the most vandalized after traffic normalization.
5.2.4 Evaluation
Learning/evaluation methodology: All results of this section were produced
using 10-fold cross validation over the PAN-WVC-10 corpus discussed in Sec. 5.2.1.
All features are calculated using only prior evidence, with aggregate features draw-
ing from all of Wikipedia history (i.e., features use evidence external to the corpus).
Models are trained using the Weka implementation of the Alternating Decision Tree
algorithm [58, 74] with Random Forests and boosting optimization. We prefer a de-
cision tree approach because of: (1) strong support for nominal and missing features,
(2) human readable output allows for easy auditing of models, and (3) terse models
scale well to Wikipedia’s high throughput operation.
Combined approach: To evaluate our techniques we combine our novel features
with those from existing approaches (particularly those built on language properties)
and evaluate them over a single corpus.8 This enables: (1) investigation into the
information gain of individual features, (2) a relative comparison of feature subset
performance (i.e., language vs. reputation vs. metadata), and (3) quantification of
over arching anti-vandalism benchmarks.
The PAN-WVC-10 corpus of Potthast and an associated anti-vandalism competi-
tion [111, 113] spurred our collaboration with other researchers in this space. Aiming
to compile a feature set representative of anti-vandalism strategy we combine our rep-
utation/metadata approach [142] with the fine grained content persistence measures
of Adler et al. [27, 29, 30] and the language approach of Mola-Velasco [99, 130]. The
concatenated feature vector has over 60 elements, summarized in Tab. 5.4 (note that
8Meaningfully comparing performance against prior literature is difficult. A standardized cor-
pus is relatively recent, with much related work pre-dating its existence. Even still, some prac-
titioners [36] reject this corpus because it was not labeled by Wikipedia experts. Regardless the
training/test set, other researchers tend to report only single points along the precision-recall curve
and not more complete plots or AUC measures.
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Figure 5.4: Precision-recall curve and AUC metrics for the combined
anti-vandalism effort [28] and subsets thereof
some descriptions wrap multiple features). We group these signals into 4 categorical
subsets (M, R, L, S) as follows:
• Metadata (M): Features that do not require inspection of article content,
derived primarily from our spatio-temporal efforts of Sec. 5.2.3.
• Reputation (R): Aggregate quantification of behavioral histories. Combines
our reputations of Sec. 5.2.2 with the fine grained ones of Adler.
• Lexical (L): Features derived from surface level properties of edit content.
• Semantic (S): These are not pure Bayesian probabilities but static token lists
derived from offline Bayesian analysis. The most indicative unigrams have been
been manually reviewed/confirmed and categorized.
Combined performance: As visualized in Fig. 5.4 and described further in [28]
we see the aggregate approach significantly outperforms component techniques. The
overall AUC=0.818 is an anti-vandalism benchmark which as of this writing remains
the highest produced to our knowledge. This is by no means a performance ceiling.
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# Metadata Reputation Lexical Semantic
1 IS REGISTERED WIKITRUST LONG CHAR SEQ VULGARITY
2 TIME SINCE REG REP EDITOR NEW TERM FREQ ALL BAD WORDS
3 TIME SINCE VAND REP ARTICLE UPPER RATIO OLD SEXUAL WORDS
4 SIZE CHANGE REP COUNTRY ALPHANUM RATIO MISC BAD WORDS
Table 5.6: Ranking anti-vandal features by information gain
We have no doubt that encoding additional features would incrementally improve
this statistic. Instead, it validates that different approaches capture independent
portions of the problem space. At 0.95 precision recall is 38%. This means that
our classifier could handle roughly two-fifths of the vandalism problem in a purely
autonomous fashion. Conversely, this is also an indication of the ongoing need for
human mitigation efforts over large parts of the problem space.
Semantic features actually perform the worst overall of any subset (AUC = 0.424)
yet they also drive aggregate performance at high precision. A steep performance
decline occurs at 30%-40% recall and we attribute this to limited dictionary depth.
While certain tokens are very indicative of vandalism, absent such vocabulary there
is little predictive capability. Other subsets have more linear dropoffs as recall in-
creases, suggesting their usefulness in routing human efforts beyond those portions
handled autonomously. This is a tactic pursued in Sec. 6.3.
Features can also be assessed individually using the information gain metric [61],
as Tab. 5.6 displays. This provides insight about vandal behavior and serves as a
reference for a live implementation where feature effectiveness must be considered
against bandwidth/computational cost. These signals are also a starting point when
considering feature development for other damage types, as we now transition to
detecting link spam behaviors.
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Figure 5.5: Constructing a corpus of link spam incidents
5.3 Link Spam Detection
Paralleling the organization of our anti-vandalism efforts, we begin by describing the
corpus used for link spam detection (Sec. 5.3.1). Features are then developed by
focusing on the reuse/extension of metadata and reputation approaches (Sec. 5.3.2).
These are then composed and evaluated (Sec. 5.3.3), creating the first anti-spam
classifier for wikis, Wikipedia, and open collaboration environments.
5.3.1 Data Sets
Being the first to study link spam behaviors requires us to amass the first link spam
corpus, a process described in greater detail in [137, 139]. Summarily, Sec. 5.2.2 de-
scribed how hindsight could be used to locate blatant damage flagged by Wikipedia
experts. The link spam subset is extracted from this by identifying revisions where:
(1) exactly one link was added and (2) manual review reveals the link and its imme-
diate context to be the only modifications. Under such criteria we know an expert’s
decision to revert the revision speaks directly to the inappropriateness of that one
link. We also identify a complementary set of ham link additions that are construc-
tive in nature. Given that we trust experts to label poor additions, by extension,
we should trust the links these users contribute. For consistency these edits are
subjected to the same “one link added” and “immediate context” filters.
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This tagging technique is biasing, as there are no ham edits contributed by un-
registered users. Especial care is taken to ensure that these biases do not become
encoded as anti-spam features: We encode no descriptors involving the account that
contributed a link. While this criterion makes the corpus non-representative, it per-
mits the construction of a sizable and confidently tagged set. Practically speaking,
our research has amassed multiple spam sets [137, 139] but it is a corpus collected
over ≈2 months in early 2011 and summarized in Fig. 5.5 which is used for evalua-
tion herein [137]. Uniquely, this collection was built in a live fashion, obtaining the
source documents at the URLs being linked.
Our measurement study showed spam instances to be nuanced and ambiguous.
The relative latency of spam reverts (ahead in Fig. 6.1) suggests they are made
by watchlisters with subject expertise. Thus, attempts to validate our corpus have
proven challenging but informative. We had experienced Wikipedia users blindly tag
corpus edits/links along a 3-point or 5-point scale. While agreement was strong over
ham portions there was a significant conservative bias for spam as users often applied
uncertain or intermediate tags (but almost never leaned towards benign labels). In
the end only about 25% of gleaned spam portions were consistently and definitively
labeled as such offline. We argue that focusing only on this most egregious subset
would oversimplify the detection task and inflate performance measures. Instead,
we contend our implicit method generates a deep two class set that leverages the
subject expertise of all trusted Wikipedia users.
While confident in those revisions the corpus has labeled, these say little about
our coverage of the problem space. One drawback of the methodology is that non-
trivial portions of link spam might escape identification. Compared to dedicated anti-
damage patrollers, subject experts are less concerned/aware of revert semantics (i.e.,
the machinery we use to identify blatant damage). Only ≈1% of the ≈125,000 links
added each month are undone in a manner consistent with blatant damage, while
upwards of 10% are undone by softer mechanisms. However, we have no evidence that
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Figure 5.7: Spam distribution by
article age × link position
there is bias in those revisions that do go unlabeled (aside from those we introduced).
We are primarily unable to reason about the prevalence of the spam problem. While
such statistics are desirable, our prior corpus validation attempts casts doubt on the
use of dedicated taggers to produce them. If revisions were outsourced to a service
like Mechanical Turk, we would expect considerable disagreement and very few spam
labels due to unfamiliarity with Wikipedia policy. Overcoming these challenges to
create a complete corpus for link spam, or any other subtly damaging behaviors,
remains an open research challenge.
5.3.2 Anti-spam Features
We organize anti-spam feature discussion into four categories, first concentrating on
features internal to the platform with: (1) simple metadata and (2) aggregate features
and reputations. Then we leave Wikipedia to: (3) analyze HTML documents at the
URL destination and (4) utilize data from third party URL information services.
Fig. 5.7 is a comprehensive listing/description of all anti-spam features and also
indicates the weight of each feature in our final classifier.
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FEATURE RNK DESCRIPTION
URL TLD •• Top-level domain of the URL (e.g., *.com or *.edu)
URL LEN • Length (in characters) of the URL being added
URL IS DOMAIN • If the URL points to a broad domain/folder or specific file
URL SUBDOMAINS • Quantity of subdomains in the URL (i.e., sub.example.com = 3)
LINK IS CITE •••• If the link was added per a special reference/citation format
LINK PLACEMENT •• Where in the article the link was added (function of article length)
LINK TEXT LEN • Length (in characters) of the hypertext description of added link
LINK DISCUSSED • Whether the link/URL is found on the article’s discussion page
ART TS CREATION •••• Age of the article where link was added (i.e., time-since creation)
ART REPUTATION ••• Historical, time-decayed measure of controversy on article [136]
ART REFERENCES • Quantity of citations/references in the article of link addition
ART LENGTH - Length of the Wikipedia article to which the link was added
ART POPULARITY * → Article visitors in last t ∈ {hour, day, week,month, 6-mos.} [13]
ART EDITS TIME * → Article edits in last t ∈ {hour, day, week,month, 6-mos.}
URL ADDS TIME * → Links to URL added in last t ∈ {hour, day, week,month, 6-mos.}
DOM ADDS TIME * → Links to domain added in last t ∈ {hour, day, week,month, 6-mos.}
URL REPUTATION ••• Historical, time-decayed measure of spam-iness for added URL
URL DIVERSITY ••• Of all historical URL links, the % added by the current editor
DOM REPUTATION •• Historical, time-decayed measure of spam-iness for added domain
DOM DIVERSITY •• Of all historical domain linkings, the % added by the current editor
META COMM LEN •••• Length (in characters) of the revision summary
META TIME DAY ••• Time-of-day when the link was added (UTC locale)
META DAY WEEK - Day-of-week when the link was added (UTC locale)
SITE PROFANE •• Measure of the prevalence of profane language on the landing site
SITE NUM IMGS •• Quantity of images displayed on the landing site
SITE SIZE •• Size (in bytes) of the textual content on the landing site
SITE COMPRESS •• Ratio of raw content-size to compressed size
SITE TITLE LEN • Length of the HTML title, in chars. (i.e., <title>. . . </title>)
SITE NUM META • Quantity of HTML <meta keywords="w1, w2, . . . , wn"> on site
SITE VOCAB LEN • Average word length of visible textual content on the landing site
SITE COMMERCIAL - Measure of the commercial intent of the landing site
SITE RELEVANT - If landing site is topic-similar to Wikipedia article of addition
ALEXA BACKLINKS •••• Quantity of incoming links to landing site, per the crawling by [2]
ALEXA DELTAS •••• Meta-feature speaking to site’s historical traffic patterns, per [2]
ALEXA ADULT ••• If the URL contains adult content, per [2]
ALEXA SPEED •• Load time of landing site, as a percentile of all sites, per [2]
ALEXA AGE •• Time that the landing site has been online, per the crawling by [2]
ALEXA CONTINENT • Continent to which the whois registration of site maps, per [2]
GOOG MALWARE - If URL is active on the Google Safe Browsing “malware” list
GOOG PHISHING - If URL is active on the Google Safe Browsing “phishing” list
Table 5.7: Comprehensive listing of anti-spam features organized by
data source. Feature rank/importance was calculated by performing
a greedy step-wise comparison over feature subsets [87, 151]. More
bullets indicate greater weight in the final classifier. For brevity, rank
is omitted for features having multiple variations (indicated by “→”).
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FEATURE UNIT HAM SPAM
URL LEN chars. 64 38
LINK PLACEMENT % art. 41 73
LINK TEXT LEN chars. 26 24
ART TS CREATION mos. 146 192
URL IS DOMAIN bool. 6.3% 37.5%
LINK IS CITE bool. 53.9% 8.3%
LINK DISCUSSED bool. 4.5% 2.4%
Table 5.8: Comparing metadata
features for link additions; non-
percentages presented at median
On-wiki metadata: In addition to reusing some of the most effective features from
the anti-vandalism task our metadata set considers the surface properties of the link
and how it is presented on the article:
• Reusing Vandalism Features: Similar to our vandalism findings, there is
a tendency for näıve spammers not to use edit comments. Additionally, older
and often edited content has often matured to a point that these articles are
less receptive to new links (Fig. 5.7 and Tab. 5.8).
• URL Properties: Spam URLs are 1.7× shorter and 30% more likely to point
to domains (Tab. 5.8). The top-level domain (TLD) of constructive links is
skewed towards those with greater administrative control (Fig. 5.6).
• Link Presentation: Citation spamming (using a URL as a reference for
some fact) is 6.5× less likely than with general purpose links (Tab. 5.8). Most
spam is appended to explicit “external links” sections (by convention), one
reason it tends to appear towards the end of articles.
On-wiki reputation and aggregates: The wiki history of a web property is one
of the best indicators of its quality. Given the atomic nature of hyperlinks it is
straightforward to monitor link survival. The persistence (or lack thereof) for a
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URL serves as feedback for a reputation algorithm that can be spatially extended
to domain granularity. These reputations can be contextualized via histograms over
addition dynamics. Bursty additions for previously unseen domains are often indica-
tive of spam. Accordingly, long term addition history is indicative of link quality:
ham domains have 5× the 6-month quantity of spam ones. Encoding editor-link
diversity, the CDF of Fig. 5.8 shows 40% of spam links are added by an editor who
is responsible for all recent links to that domain (versus just 15% for ham).
Landing site analysis: Using lexical language properties (some drawn directly
from related work [46, 103]) we attempt to capture commercial intention, inappro-
priate content, and search engine optimization on landing sites. None of these re-
sulted in particularly impressive information gain and further reinforce the diversity
of spam content, the lack of commercial intention, and an absence of SEO strategies.
Third party reputation and metadata: Internet scale measurements are useful
when assessing a URL/domain, and we utilize the Alexa API [2] to provide this broad
perspective. The quantity of backlinks (i.e., inbound links) a site has, a measure of
global reputation, is the most heavily weighted feature in our classifier. At median
a ham site has ≈850 backlinks compared to just 20 for spam links (Fig. 5.9). Traffic
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trends function similarly and feature ALEXA DELTAS is the output of a lower order
classifier wrapping over 50 data points regarding viewership statistics. Even the
continent which hosts a website can be indicative as Fig. 5.10 demonstrates.
5.3.3 Evaluation
Like our anti-vandalism work the anti-spam model is built using ADTrees and eval-
uated using 10-fold cross validation. The PR curve of Fig. 5.11 best summarizes
classifier performance. The complete feature set achieves a 0.917 PR-AUC (ver-
sus 0.82 for vandalism). At 0.95 precision recall is ≈67%, indicating two-thirds of
spam can be handled autonomously. Given the prior lack of preventative anti-spam
infrastructure on Wikipedia a live implementation of this technique would serve
tremendous utility. The “on Wikipedia” feature subset drives classifier performance
(PR-AUC=0.909) almost to the exclusion of other sets, yet these signals are easily
manipulated. Gamesmanship of third party signals would require considerable ef-
fort (e.g., expensive TLDs, spamming to amass backlinks, etc.) and more heavily
weighting these would improve robustness albeit with performance costs [137].
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5.4 Broader Applications
Previous sections have made clear the capabilities of reputation and metadata fea-
tures with respect to English Wikipedia and the anti-vandalism/spam tasks. Now
through a series of brief case studies their portability is demonstrated across addi-
tional damage types (Sec. 5.4.1), natural languages (Sec. 5.4.2), and content formats
(Sec. 5.4.3). Since our original description of these methods we have also observed
their reuse in third party open collaboration security research, including vandalism
detection in mapping applications [48, 101].
5.4.1 Copyright Violations
In Sec. 4.1.3 we described a class of damage that legally endangers Wikipedia and
found copyright violations particularly problematic. Textual copyright violations are
usually the result of copy-pasting protected content found elsewhere on the Internet
(often promotional) into Wikipedia articles. Since the damage is not surface level,
humans are particularly poor at mitigating it, with our work suggesting copyright
violations survive orders of magnitude longer than most damage [144] (Fig. 4.4).
This motivated research into autonomous discovery mechanisms [20]. Anti-
plagiarism algorithms leveraged over Internet crawled documents form the core of
our approach [8]. However, metadata (over participatory dynamics) and reputation
(capturing prior involvement in copyright cases) features are also being built from
a user labeled corpus of incidents. Similar to our findings for other damage types,
signals that speak to community inexperience prove particularly helpful, as do those
regarding atypical content evolution (e.g., monolithic content additions are suspi-
cious). Work is underway to mechanize these techniques and secure the community
approval needed to leverage them in a live fashion [20].
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Figure 5.12: Precision-recall curves for German (left) and Spanish
(right) Wikipedia test sets, comparing performance of natively and
English trained models
5.4.2 Non-English Wikipedias
The vast majority of anti-damage research has been performed on English Wikipedia.
Yet just one-third of the 12 million monthly edits to Wikipedia occur on its English
version [22]. The PAN-WVC-11 data set [111] makes available both German and
Spanish vandalism corpora, compiled similarly to the English version of Sec. 5.2.1.
In [143] we use these corpora to investigate a number of properties regarding the
cost effectiveness and benefits of language features. The most significant result, and
that summarized here, is the portability of our reputation/metadata approach.
One can think about portability in two ways: (1) Feature portability, where sig-
nal calculation code can be reused and brought into force after retraining over a
new corpus, and (2) classifier portability, where one trains over one labeled set of
instances (e.g., English) and brings the resulting model into force over a set from
a different environment (e.g., Spanish). This implies that both features and their
values/threshold are portable, a very powerful notion. Amassing a representative
labeled corpus would be a non-trivial burden for smaller communities. For perspec-
tive, Potthast [110, 111] spent $3000+ (USD) on Mechanical Turk labeling for the
English corpus. A single generic classification model of even moderate performance
would have tremendous impact for Wikipedia’s 285+ language editions.
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To investigate this a set of anti-vandalism features are identified that are not lan-
guage specific. A model is trained over the English corpus and the Spanish/German
corpus is provided as the test set. Fig. 5.12 visualizes the results, comparing them
against cross validation output over the equivalent language corpus. In both cases
the results are quite comparable: a 7% loss in performance for German (0.811 AUC
vs. 0.885) and a 4% AUC gain for Spanish (0.843 vs. 0.805). As a point of comparison
recall that 0.82 AUC was our language inclusive performance over the English cor-
pus.9 Such subtleties should not obfuscate the larger point: These initial results are
an encouraging first step towards developing completely generic models useful across
environments that vary in size and scope. One could imagine such models being part
of default security functionality packaged with open collaboration software.
5.4.3 Code Repositories
When considering non-wiki environments that might benefit from our techniques,
collaborative code repositories are a good fit. They are version control systems
that are OCA-capable, inhibited only by the fact their use cases tend to employ
high barriers to entry. Such barriers all but eliminate malicious damage and should
challenge our methods’ ability to make subtle behavioral distinctions (e.g., distin-
guish “excellent” participants from “average” ones). Moreover, programming code
artifacts represent a use case that is not rooted in natural language.
As a case study we chose to analyze the SVN repository used to develop Me-
diawiki (the popular wiki software), which has some 170 permissioned users and
117,000 file versions in its primary /trunk line of development. In [146] we describe
9This makes it appear that finding vandalism on English Wikipedia is a “harder” problem. This
is not necessarily the case, observe: (1) The Spanish/German corpora are not representative, as
roughly one-third of each corpus is vandalism compared to 7% in the English version. (2) Differ-
ent Wikipedia’s have different security tools/configurations that can be applied proactively (see
Sec. 7.1.2) and stop vandalism before it becomes corpus eligible. These same reasons likely explain
the performance increase observed over the Spanish test set.
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CLEAR ERRORS
“introduced massive breakage . . . ”
“revert x . . . trigger errors”
“revert . . . uglier . . . prone to error”
“revert . . . do not remove functions”
AMBIGUOUS QUALITY
“revert x for now . . . needs testing”
“white-space [not per style guide]”
Table 5.9: SVN commit com-
ments associated with reputa-
tion loss events
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Figure 5.13: Editor reputations in an
example SVN repository
how SVN history can be replayed into a wiki format to make reuse of content per-
sistence reputation algorithms. That is, a developer’s reputation is based on the
survival of the code elements they introduce into the repository. These reputations
can be plotted as a function of time, as Fig. 5.13 does for four Mediawiki develop-
ers. In a proof-of-concept evaluation we sought to attribute reputation loss events
to unconstructive actions using commit comments and bug tracking reports. Repu-
tation decrements were clearly justified in roughly two-thirds of cases, and we were
surprised to find a large quantity of revert events in a production repository (see
Tab. 5.9). False positives reveal evolutionary differences between interpreted code
and natural language content, several of which include:
• Reorganization: Whereas wiki artifacts develop internal to a single file, code
content is often migrated between files. The single document model treats this
as a deletion (hurting the reputation of content authors) and disjoint addition
(the “new” code has no provenance information).
• Need for testing : Revert actions justified by the need for further testing some-
times follow large commits but do not imply the code is “bad”. This results in
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massive reputation loss: (1) for the code author, when the code is temporarily
removed, and eventually, (2) for whomever requested more testing, because
their revert is invalidated when testing is complete and the code is eventually
committed in a form similar to the initial attempt. Natural language text is
not interpreted/functional and has no equivalent.
• Non-functional text : Code comments and whitespace changes are surprisingly
prevalent and dynamic. Since this is non-functional text, it could be argued
that it should not be included in reputation computation.
Algorithmic adjustments could eliminate many of these shortcomings. For example,
code migration could be captured by modeling compile/runtime dependent groups
of files as a single artifact (e.g., a very lengthy code file for diff purposes). Language
specific tokenization and parsing could create canonical code versions that emphasize
functional aspects. These improvements could be integrated with technical [67, 93]
and social [39] observations regarding faults/quality in collaborative code.
Developing formal corpora for purposes of evaluation and feature extraction is
challenging. Bugs are notoriously hard to track and associate to any single au-
thor/commit. Regardless, the proposed reputations could be immediately useful in
prioritizing code review. One possible application is the vehicleforge.mil [49]
project that intends to crowdsource the physical and software design of a military
vehicle with unconventionally low barriers to entry. Towards securing access control
in that setting, we are exploring the inclusion of content driven reputation alongside
traditional quality measures such as test suites and static code analysis.
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Chapter 6
Improving Human Mitigation
Humans are a necessary element in the security of open collaboration applications. In
the last chapter our state-of-the-art computational mechanisms were only capable of
mitigating about half of the problem space. Not just a shortcoming of our approach,
our measurement studies found there may be fundamental limits regarding the ef-
fectiveness of automated defense. While humans may be required, Sec. 4.2 showed
severe inefficiencies in how they were currently being organized and routed. Towards
improving this we define evaluation metrics for the task (Sec. 6.1) before discussing
our approach for optimizing human security actors (Sec. 6.2). Unlike autonomous
modeling done over offline corpora, evaluating and improving human behaviors re-
quires us to develop and deploy software integrating our approach (Sec. 6.3). The
resulting tool has been used to review more than one million Wikipedia edits, a data
set we mine to learn more about mitigation behaviors (Sec. 6.4).
6.1 Evaluation Metrics
We consider two evaluation metrics that speak to the efficiency of human mitigation:
(1) damage survival time and (2) damage impact/exposure:
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Figure 6.1: CDF of lifespan and exposure for damage events removed
by humans; note this excludes damage removed by autonomous bots
Incident longevity: Calculating the survival time of a damage incident is straight-
forward, as it is the interval between damage being committed and its removal.
Lengthy damage survival: (1) Provides more opportunity for the damage to be con-
sumed by end users on the platform, external content scrapers, and search engine
crawlers, (2) permits more damage, since the associated accounts are latent in re-
ceiving warnings and block actions, and (3) may encourage more damage, as latent
detection may be interpreted as success by the perpetrator. Fig. 6.1 plots the sur-
vival time for incidents in our corpora of prior chapters, finding human identified
vandalism incidents survive for 75 seconds at median and spam instances for 1200
seconds. This difference between damage types substantiates earlier claims about
the lack of specialized functionality for anti-spam patrol and the fact most spam is
handled at watchlister granularity.
Impact and exposure: Rather than simply measuring the time damage survived
one can assess the impact incurred during that period. Such a metric might include
the quantity of people that consumed the damage (i.e., the exposure), measures of
severity, and/or prominence. For Wikipedia we are able to interpret an incident’s
impact as the number of individuals that viewed the damaged article. Fine grained
article traffic statistics enable the accurate estimation of this quantity [22, 114, 139,
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147]. Damaged views affect external perceptions and speak to the utility an attacker
might derive. For example, every link spam exposure is a potential click-through
and visit to the spam landing site [86, 141].
While exposure/impact has stronger statistical underpinnings than longevity that
does not make it a “better” metric. Consider that a damage instance with low
exposure can still have a considerable survival time and incur the ill-effects discussed
above. Fig. 6.1 plots the exposure quantity for our damage corpora, with the median
human mitigated vandalism instance having 1.6 viewers compared to 6 viewers in
the spam case (the difference is 14 vs. 39 views at the third-quartile). Sec. 6.2.1
references the article popularity statistics that underlie this result.
6.2 Routing and Organizational Approach
Improving human mitigation requires addressing the defense shortcomings described
in Sec. 4.2.2. Towards eliminating näıve damage patrol we interpret our evalua-
tion metrics as objective functions and use these to prioritize the review process
(Sec. 6.2.1). Seeking to minimize simultaneous and redundant work we then coordi-
nate distributed access to this prioritization logic (Sec. 6.2.2).
6.2.1 Review Prioritization
Our goal is to construct an intelligent routing [43] system for damage patrollers.
For simplicity assume a set of revisions – some damaging, some not – has been
simultaneously committed to Wikipedia. The burden of reviewing these edits falls
to a single individual. The order in which he/she chooses to perform the reviews
(a priority queue) is the only free variable, with performance being measured in an
ex post facto fashion using our evaluation metrics. A näıve and poorly performing
strategy is to randomly prioritize these edits, one that far too often describes the
status quo on Wikipedia. Instead, consider prioritization based on:
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# ARTICLE Vs/HR.
1 Facebook 3723
2 Wiki 3377
3 Deaths in 2012 2899
4 One Direction 2549
5 The Avengers 2539
6 50 Shades of Grey 2484
7 2012 Phenomenon 2351
8 Dark Knight Rises 2153
Table 6.1: Wikipedia’s
most popular articles in
2012 by avg. hourly views
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Figure 6.2: log-log plot exhibiting power
law distribution of article popularity
Probabilistic strategy: One can use computational methods (like those of the
prior chapter) to compute the probability that each edit is damage. This probability
becomes the priority for queue insertion. By reviewing the most likely damage first,
one minimizes the cumulative survival time of the damage subset. Moreover, at all
points during the review process the recall is maximized (i.e., as many vandalism
cases as possible have been mitigated).
Expected exposure strategy: In order to minimize cumulative damage exposure
one needs to know the expected traffic on the corresponding articles. With this one
can use the product of the view rate and damage probability to prioritize individual
revisions. As Fig. 6.2 visualizes, article popularity follows a power law distribution.
This gives rise to interesting queue properties. For example, a revision on the “Face-
book” article (the most popular on Wikipedia in 2012, see Tab. 6.1) computed to
have a 1% probability of damage will be prioritized above 100% certain damage on
99.99% of articles. Relative to consistently popular articles, traffic spikes [147] can
give rise to even more dramatic dynamics (Tab. 6.2).
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# ARTICLE REASON DATE Vs/SEC.
1 Whitney Houston Death of subject 12 Feb 2012 425.6
2 Amy Winehouse Death of subject 23 Jul 2011 377.5
3 Steve Jobs Death of subject 6 Oct 2011 295.5
4 Madonna Super Bowl halftime 6 Feb 2012 275.9
5 Osama bin Laden Death of subject 2 May 2011 239.5
6 The Who Super Bowl halftime 7 Feb 2010 157.8
7 Ryan Dunn Death of subject 20 Jun 2011 145.1
8 Jodie Foster Golden Globes speech 14 Jan 2013 125.4
Table 6.2: Peak traffic events on English Wikipedia from 2010-2012,
determined at hour granularity (“Vs/SEC.” = views per second)
6.2.2 Organizational Primitives
Intelligent prioritization is a first step towards improved mitigation. However, if
distributed actors independently calculate and route themselves according to the
same logic they will all: (1) simultaneously and/or (2) redundantly review the same
edits, to (3) the exclusion of others that may also be damaging (three of the short-
comings identified in Sec. 4.2). Instead one can centrally calculate and maintain a
priority queue of revisions. Then, client-server communication can better coordinate
patrollers and enforce organizational primitives. For discussion purposes, we make
the simplifying assumption that all edit reviews happen internal to our framework.
When a client requests a revision it should be popped the unlocked edit with
highest priority. When an edit is given to a client a revision level lock should be
enforced until released. A lock is released: (1) when the client provides feedback
on the edit they were assigned or (2) no feedback is received within some deadline.
Feedback must be of least binary specificity (i.e., damage and not-damage) and
intermediate granularity are supported.
Edits labeled damaging should correspond to a revert (on Wikipedia) and de-
queue action. Critically, non-damaging classifications must be annotated and impact
queue structure (establishing the notion of explicit innocence). If users are trusted
and/or non-guilt is definitive, then a dequeue action may be appropriate. Other
situations might dictate reducing the review priority associated with the edit. There
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Figure 6.3: Architecture of the STiki framework; here showing the
internal calculation for a single scoring/queue system.
are other queue dynamics to consider but these are primarily practical considerations
addressed in the next section.
6.3 Live Implementation (STiki)
We implement the prioritization and organizational models we just described as a
software framework named STiki [136].10 We begin by describing the client-server
architecture of the tool (Sec. 6.3.1) before outlining practical adjustments needed to
accommodate live operation, at Wikipedia scale, amongst security actors not bound
by our coordinating strategies (Sec. 6.3.2).
6.3.1 System Architecture
STiki’s system architecture (Fig. 6.3) consists of (1) multiple revision queues on a
centralized server, and (2) a client GUI tool to interface with that logic.
10The name STiki is derived from “Spatio-Temporal analysis over Wikipedia”. The software was
initially intended only to support a classifier built off our reputation and metadata features [142]. It
has since evolved into a more general purpose tool, so this acronymic significance is now downplayed.
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Back end queuing: Three different anti-damage classifiers prioritize revisions:
1. Metadata + Reputation: An implementation of the system described in
Sec. 5.2, absent much of the semantic/lexical language functionality.
2. CBNG: Bayesian document classification as calculated by a third party [36].
3. Link spam: An implementation of the system described in Sec. 5.3
In near real time each system calculates a probability on [0, 1] for every revision
made to Wikipedia. This is the basis for the insertion priority into two queues: one
purely probabilistic and another that integrates recent traffic statistics [22] to sort
by expected exposure (yielding 6 queues in total). The behavior of these queues is
linked, e.g., a lock in one queue extends to all other queues.
Front end GUI tool: Fig. 6.4 shows the GUI tool that clients use to interface with
our queuing logic. While organizational matters are enforced in the background, a
user interacts with the tool primarily by reviewing diffs (GUI center) and selecting
from four classification options (left-center):
• Damage/Vandalism: The edit is dequeued and reverted. The perpetrator
is automatically warned at the appropriate level or a block request lodged.
• Good Faith Revert: The edit is dequeued and reverted.
• Pass: The lock is released on the edit and an annotation is made to ensure
the current reviewer will never again see this particular revision.
• Innocent: The edit is dequeued.
No matter the classification the feedback is stored to improve future learning and
the GUI automatically advances to the next revision. Pre-fetching and threading are
used to minimize transitional latency between reviews. Front end users can choose
the priortiy queue from which they draw edits.
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Figure 6.4: STiki user interface showing an instance of vandalism
6.3.2 Accommodating Live Operation
It would be beneficial for Wikipedia if all revision reviews were conducted within
the STiki framework.11 STiki can easily add new queues or damage logic and al-
ternative GUI tools are free to interface with our back end system. In practice a
majority of patrol/watchlist reviews occur external to our tool’s scope. Combined
with the massive scale of the task, these factors dictate design decisions that better
accommodate the realities of anti-damage work:
11Really, the native Wikipedia platform and other tools just need to speak a standardized lan-
guage regarding: (1) edits currently under review (for locking) and (2) reviews producing a non-
guilty result (to prevent redundant review at patrol granularity).
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Review depth: STiki’s queues only contain revisions which are most recent on
their articles, regardless of whether the previous edit was reviewed or not. A new
edit on a page will overwrite and re-prioritize any existing queue entry for that
artifact. Deep inspections are best performed by watchlisters with subject expertise;
STiki intends only to be a patrol tool for blatant damage.
Immediate competition: Most revision scrutiny, including redundant portions,
tends to happen in the moments after a new edit is made. In this period, bots
run their analysis (their reverts may take several seconds due to computational and
network latency) as traditional and tool enabled patrollers rush to be the first to
discover damage [60]. Recall that the median vandalism survival time is just 75
seconds per Fig. 6.1. STiki avoids this competition by only enqueuing edits after
they have survived for a minimum of 60 seconds. This is one reason Fig. 6.6 shows
STiki has reverted no damage quicker than that threshold.
Stale probabilities: When damage is discovered outside the STiki framework the
resulting revert will overwrite the damaging edit in the queues. Edits which are
externally reviewed but not reverted remain unchanged in those queues. The longer
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a highly prioritized edit remains in the queue, the greater the likelihood that the
edit is innocent (i.e., a computational “false positive”), not simply that no one
has discovered the damage. Fig. 6.5 makes this explicit over empirical data. We
begin with a set of edits computed to have an 80% probability of vandalism (and
when tagged offline, we have confirmed ≈80% are damaging). In live operation, a
subset classified one minute after they were committed showed a 60% incidence of
damage. Even in this short interval patrollers external to our tool had discovered
non-trivial parts of the damaging subset, leaving a higher ratio of non-damage in the
queues. Edits surviving and classified after 36 hours only exhibited a 33% incidence
of vandalism. We are able to compute these rates of decay and are exploring their
use to update priorities based on in-queue survival times.
6.4 Understanding Human Response
Since releasing the STiki tool in June 2010 it has been used by the English Wikipedia
community to classify over 1.1+ million revisions. Of these, 350,000+ have been iden-
tified as damaging and reverted from the encyclopedia. Moreover, STiki’s popularity
and market share among anti-vandal tools is continuing to grow.
The client-server engineering of the tool has allowed us to extensively log and
timestamp every connection request, query, and classification action taken within
the tool. These logs and the associated revision metadata are a tremendous resource
regarding human mitigation behaviors. We first mine this data for insight on individ-
ual reviewers, assessing their motivations for patrolling and characteristics in doing
so (Sec. 6.4.1). Then we look at aggregate effects, examining how these reviewers
cumulatively affect tool adoption and queuing dynamics (Sec. 6.4.2).
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Figure 6.7: STiki tool use as a function of time
6.4.1 Individual Participation and Motivation
Who patrols: Since STiki’s creation 640 users have downloaded the tool and clas-
sified at least one revision. To prevent tool abuse the Wikipedia community requires
that a user have non-trivial anti-damage experience.12 However, access requests
from unqualified new users and recently caught vandals have not been uncommon.
Some users are converts from other anti-vandalism tools. Based on volunteered de-
mographic information we know the user base is primarily young (under 30), male,
educated, and draws from the United States, England, and India (which is not atyp-
ical of the English Wikipedia user base at large [2]).
Extent of participation: A STiki participant spends around 6 seconds reviewing
each edit they are assigned. This suggests it would take ≈125 man hours to patrol all
the article edits made to English Wikipedia each day. While this is a burden that 20
full time workers could handle, the volunteers who do this work are understandably
less dedicated. The average edit “session” [59] consists of about 50 reviews.
We find one factor influential in extending or shortening session length: the revert
12Per our threat model of Sec. 2.4, attackers are unable to secure the advanced permission that
enables STiki use. Vandals cannot dequeue the damage they commit. If STiki were universally en-
abled it could shift to a “decrement priority” model instead of a “dequeue” one, with the decrement
delta for innocent classifications determined by user reputation.
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Figure 6.8: Reward “barnstar” to gamify and incentivize tool use
rate that end users experience, i.e., the percentage of edits one classifies as damaging.
The tool averages a 33% revert rate across history, but this is an unscientific measure
due to environmental and queue dynamics. However, the metric certainly shapes
the perceptions of end users. When users have a session with a revert rate over 40%
they tend to extend those sessions, with rates below 20% spurring early termination.
Seeing edit sessions abandoned at 20% density may also speak to user conditioning;
consider that traditional random search will yield a < 4% revert rate (since about
half of the original 7% is taken care of by bots).
The typical 5 minute patrol session is about half the duration of those measured
broadly across the encyclopedia [59]. Reviewing is repetitive and monotonous work
and this likely affects one’s dedication to the task both in individual sessions and as a
long term commitment. The median participant uses the STiki tool only for 8 days,
though a small set of long term users stretch the average to 88.6 days. Overall there
is a high turnover rate in the user base. Users who abandon the tool tend not to stop
contributing to Wikipedia altogether. Instead, we find them fulfilling alternative and
arguably more complex and rewarding project roles. As Goldman [63] has observed,
anti-damage patrol is not a particularly fulfilling task as it is rote work where one
frequently encounters immature and offensive content [41, 124].
Reviewer motivations: Understanding why users abandon the tool, we now con-
sider what motivates those who do participate. Incentives for open collaboration
participation vary [56] but rarely are there monetary and/or tangible benefits. There
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are, however, notions of status and reputation internal to these social communities.
Some feel that status is correlated with one’s editing rate, an affliction that experi-
enced Wikipedia users sarcastically term “edit-count-itis” [55, 72]. Damage patrol,
particularly when well prioritized, is an efficient means to amass many edits.13
Regardless one’s opinion on edit count inflation, few can deny this damage patrol
is a good thing for the encyclopedia when done accurately. Thus we try to harness
this trend and increase user throughput. Toward this we have implemented a com-
petitive “scoreboard” of STiki use and recognized/rewarded continued participation
with “barnstars” [88] (Fig. 6.8). Both functionalities were initiated in early 2012 and
we partially attribute the increase in tool participation at that time to their effects
(Fig. 6.7). Even so, motivations driven by edit count are not entirely beneficial. We
have observed isolated incidents of aggressive bias in labeling vandalism and hasty
reviewing rates. Gamesmanship has been observed via the manipulation of queuing
dynamics so a user could inflate his/her revert rate (i.e., labeling “innocent” edits
with “pass” so other users must re-review them, as the original reviewer receives
fresh edits).14 Moreover, revert hungry motivations cause users to abandon editing
when those rates decline. This has unfortunate consequences for queues prioritized
by expected exposure instead of pure damage probability, as improbable damage on
extremely popular articles tends to sit atop these queues.
Finally, our above discussion applies only to anti-vandalism behaviors. Usage
of anti-spam queues has been minimal (<1% of classifications). Our probabilistic
models indicate these queues are ripe with damage, as there are no active anti-spam
bots and little competitive review. Yet the average anti-spam review takes over 60
seconds time as one must analyze the landing site. Recall also that our measurement
13We do not claim that all damage patrollers in our user base apply this philosophy. However,
behaviors suggest the trend is quite prominent, even if it is not entirely intentional.
14Such gamesmanship was surprising given our user base is specially permissioned. Because
non-guilty classifications like “innocent” and “pass” do not generate on-wiki evidence they can
be misused. If edits were redundantly reviewed, one could detect users with divergent labeling
patterns. Not content to sacrifice scalability in this fashion we have instead codified expected
statistical usage trends that trigger manual audits if violated.
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studies found spam behavior to be subtle, requiring greater discretion and policy
knowledge on the part of reviewers. Heavy use of the “pass” classification and our
personal experience confirms there is often ambiguity over how to label a revision.
Many times it is clear that a linking behavior is non-ideal but uncertainty whether
it meets the spam threshold. There are also social reasons for such a conservative
bias, as it is not unusual for spammers to become confrontational about their link’s
removal. The average reviewer seems unwilling to make these distinctions. Many of
the cases our models label as high probability but STiki users choose not to revert
are eventually removed with a latency suggesting watchlister involvement. This fact
is evidence there is not a pathological failure of our training set or classification
models.
6.4.2 Aggregate Trends
Having assessed individual participation and motivation we now examine the cu-
mulative effects of this workforce on queue dynamics and edit assignment. As of
early 2013 the STiki tool averages 30 review sessions daily, classifying 1500–2000
edits, and consuming 2–3 hours of labor. For context, STiki currently rivals Hug-
gle [16] as English Wikipedia’s most popular review tool although a majority of diff
inspections are still performed via the native interface. While STiki’s popularity
is increasing (Fig. 6.7) the global quantity of patrollers is decreasing [72], making
STiki’s intelligent routing all the more necessary.
Just as revert rate influences the duration of review sessions, it appears to do the
same with tool adoption and user retention. The size of the user base is inversely
correlated to the damage density individual users experience (assuming static user
throughput and stable market share). Periods of low tool use have given rise to en-
thusiastic users and promotional efforts that generated short term popularity spikes.
However, the influx of new users that results makes it impossible to meet advertised
expectations regarding revert rate. The result is an odd paradox of tool popularity
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vs. user satisfaction, driven by the fact we have crowdsourced the discovery of a finite
resource (damage). As a point of reference, recent month long sliding intervals have
seen an average of ≈65 users classify using the tool.
It is this aggregate group that influences what edits get reviewed. Fig. 6.9 shows
the output of a probabilistic scoring model in live operation, suggesting the vast
majority of edits on Wikipedia pose little damage threat (only 8% of edits indicate
a 25%+ damage probability). STiki attacks this set in a top-down fashion with
Fig. 6.10 showing the probabilities classified by STiki users. STiki rarely displays
the most confident damage as this portion is handled by bots and quick acting
reviewers (the confidence would imply this is “low hanging fruit”). Conversely, edits
below 40% probability are rarely reviewed because: (1) per the previous section,
this is the threshold where users tend to lose interest (recall the empirical decay of
Fig. 6.5) and (2) it requires a great quantity of classifications in a short window to
deplete the queue to such depth given the incoming edit rate.
It is surprising to see that most of the damage undone by STiki is not recent
(Fig. 6.6). A median lifetime of 1.2 hours makes it obvious patrollers are incomplete
in their coverage. The fact the third-quartile lifetime is 6 hours suggests that were
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STiki not in place much of this damage might have become embedded on the article.
This evidence suggests that STiki and its philosophy are not just another entry in the
race to discover vandalism, but it is helping users locate damage that might never
have been located otherwise. Incredibly, two edits reverted by STiki were enqueued
over a year before they were assigned and classified.
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Chapter 7
Discussion and Future Work
Complementing the academic contributions of this dissertation (as summarized in
Chap. 8), our impact on Wikipedia’s security landscape has been significant. We
begin by reviewing these advances before offering suggestions on how to improve
Wikipedia’s practical security with the further integration of our work (Sec. 7.1).
However, our research is not without limitations. By discussing the weaknesses
of our approaches and overarching vulnerabilities of the collaborative paradigm we
identify open questions on which future work can focus (Sec. 7.2).
7.1 Practical Improvements
Portions of our work are already a part of Wikipedia’s operations and toolkit, proving
themselves to be valuable security assets (Sec. 7.1.1). There is the potential for
these developments to play an even larger role if they can be better integrated into
the platform (Sec. 7.1.2). Finally, we consider situations where security efforts are
insufficient and one must begin restricting collaborative permissions/scope in order
to achieve defense goals (Sec. 7.1.3).
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7.1.1 Status Quo Impacts
Recent years have seen an increased focus on Wikipedia damage. As of early 2013
the defense ecosystem is built piecemeal atop the efforts of Wikimedia employees,
academics, and Wikipedia enthusiasts. Cumulative impacts from recent work are
best contextualized by revisiting early Wikipedia research. In 2004 the median dam-
age survival interval was around 2.5 minutes [131]. Currently that number is < 10
seconds since automated mechanisms handle roughly half of the problem space [36].
However, this buries improvements to human response. There were no autonomous
anti-damage bots when the 2.5 minute survival figure was produced in 2004 and
Fig. 6.1 shows how manually reverted portions fare in the modern day, persisting
roughly half the time of the earlier result (from 2.5 → 1.3 minutes). Measurements
of end user exposure are similar. Currently ≈65% of human handled damage has
< 1 viewer and the exposure CDF (again, Fig. 6.1) is similar to one produced in
2007 [114]. This stability is impressive considering English Wikipedia’s exponential
growth in the interval. Page views, article count, and many other metrics grew by
about 50× between 2004 and 2012. Summarily, the past 5 years have seen the emer-
gence of algorithms that can mitigate nearly half of damage and editing tools have
helped humans scale reasonably well over the remainder.
Our work has been an important component in this cumulative improvement.
Our reputation/metadata classifiers for vandalism (Sec. 5.2) and anti-spam (Sec. 5.3)
are implemented and processing all Wikipedia edits. Only bureaucratic issues have
prevented these from being leveraged autonomously. Regardless, these scoring en-
gines are being utilized in multiple ways. Most obvious is the STiki tool [136] with
350,000+ reverts on English Wikipedia (Sec. 6.3). Work is ongoing to internation-
alize that interface and make use of language independent anti-vandalism models
(Sec. 5.4.2). Another tool, WikiAudit [135], leverages these scores to report on dam-
aging users/revisions from a user provided set of IP addresses (Fig. 7.1). The tool is
useful for network administrators (e.g., auditing contributions from their managed IP
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Figure 7.1: Snippet from a WikiAudit [135] report; note that user IP
addresses have been redacted for privacy
space) and those conducting investigations into editing bias [145]. Third parties also
use our probabilities. For instance, the Snuggle [70, 72, 127] tool uses them to locate
newcomers that are not damaging and encourage their continued participation.
Minor contributions also abound. Our description of mechanized attack mod-
els [139, 141] (upcoming in Sec. 7.2) influenced configuration settings. Additionally,
we have developed a tool to expedite the review/labeling of a user provided set of
edits. The “Offline Review Tool” [136] has been used by other practitioners for
corpus building and user audits. We have also taken the statistics used to predict
and measure damage impact and use them to regularly report on Wikipedia’s traf-
fic trends [147]. Finally, we have provided perspective on how institutions can help
prevent damaging behaviors with a focus on education and internal monitoring [145].
7.1.2 Extending Platform Integration
While the practical contributions of our work are significant their impact could be
even greater with cooperation from wiki developers and other tool authors.
Beginning with the prevention of damage, Wikipedia processes edits against an
anti-damage rule set before they commit (the “Edit Filter”). If a rule is matched
the editor is notified and can alter/abandon the revision, a “scare tactic” to deter
vandals. However, the current manually written rules fall short of the capabilities of
described machine learning models. The filter should also be configured so it is less
98
adverse to false positives (typically just warnings that can be overridden). There
is little technical value in duplicating subsequent bot logic, and the goal should be
getting vandals to abandon damage that would need human mitigation.
This redundancy and poor interconnect between platform security (e.g., the edit
filter) and editor contributed logic (e.g., the bot) is a pervasive issue in Wikipedia’s
decentralized security landscape. While this follows from Wikipedia’s community
driven philosophies it would seem the mission critical nature of security warrants
better integration. At current, complex anti-damage logic is accessible only through
independent third party tools. Annotating or overlaying this information directly
on the native interface would benefit watchlisters and casual users. Moreover, the
functionality could be included with wiki software packages that currently ship with
only rudimentary security functions and vandal friendly configurations [145].15
Cooperation is also needed to eliminate redundant and incomplete work. While
STiki has a notion of “explicit innocence”, other tools and the native platform do
not generate evidence of non-guilty inspections. Simply knowing what diffs have
been rendered would be beneficial. More powerfully, a centralized and real time
“anti-damage clearinghouse” could be established to share review information and
influence human routing decisions. While this should not replace eventual reviews
by subject experts, dedicated and topic agnostic patrollers enable the quick reversion
of obvious damage. Such users are a necessary part of timely damage response and
it would be worthwhile to explore further gamification and incentives to combat
their limited patience and high turnover rates. While focus on patrollers is intuitive,
security functionality is also needed to streamline the work of watchlist reviewers.
Their dedication to certain topics make them less ephemeral security actors and they
have the expertise needed to confidently remove subtle damage.
15Recall that our research also suggested the potential for generic anti-damage models built atop
participatory dynamics and/or implicit reputation. Simple interpretations of these concepts could
compute the probabilities/priorities needed to drive these tools and annotations.
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7.1.3 Security Tradeoffs
The system model for this dissertation (Sec. 2.4) assumed “pure” open collaboration
where all users can modify any artifact. While Wikipedia strives to uphold this
model, practical restrictions have emerged with the project’s exponential growth.
Also concerning is the potential for more limitations as traffic continues to surge [22]
and editor/patroller/administrative populations stagnate or dwindle [63, 71, 127].
Goldman [63] ties the expansion of restrictions directly to Wikipedia’s recent and
future survival. More generally, these restrictions might be applied to any open
collaborative application whose defenses are not adequately scaling.
All of the proposed/enacted restrictions follow from the same principle: restrict
the user groups which are allowed to revise some artifact(s). Compared to status
quo approaches our developments in this dissertation offer a more autonomous and
elegant means to determine these restrictions. Moreover, our suggestions minimize
social/participatory impacts for well intentioned users.
The most dramatic suggestion is to eliminate unregistered editing on all arti-
facts. While unregistered editors are frequent vandals, their constructive efforts
are still 10% of the project total [81]. Forced registration does not prohibit par-
ticipation, but research shows even constructive users often abandon actions when
presented barriers (e.g., CAPTCHAs) [100]. There is no evidence that obstructions
dis-incentivize bad users more than good ones; they have been traditionally applied
only to limit automated abuse. We see little justification in implementing a restric-
tion that impacts innocent users as much as guilty ones. Alternative proposals have
called for a more fine grained user hierarchy over which to apply restrictions. The
codification of new user groups along arbitrary and easily manipulated criteria (e.g.,
edit count) serve little purpose. If one needs to evaluate a user it is preferable to use
the reputations we compute or more robust measures of a contribution history [82].
The need for quantitative measures instead of blanket policies also resonates in
the article protection scheme deployed on≈5000 English Wikipedia articles. Therein,
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Figure 7.2: On-wiki link placement (left) and landing site (right) for
proof-of-concept link spam attacks
articles experiencing frequent damage may request “protection” and be made read-
only for unregistered/newly-registered users. The proposed pending changes system
prefers a non-public quarantine in favor of explicit blocking. Regardless, the deci-
sion over which artifacts to protect should not be a manual one. Applying human
discretion and bureaucracy to combat situations where manual effort is currently in-
sufficient is paradoxical. Our article reputations capture the most abused pages and
protection could be autonomously triggered at certain thresholds. We also advocate
the preventative protection of extremely popular articles, and the power law distri-
bution of article views in Fig. 6.2 shows this would protect a tremendous number of
exposures while impacting relatively few artifacts.
Autonomous handling also enables protection at revision granularity without the
need to explicitly target certain articles for focus. We have demonstrated accurate
anti-damage engines whose output probability could dictate revisions being marked
for: (1) autonomous reversion, (2) private quarantine, or (3) immediate publication
with prioritized ex post facto review. Interfaces like STiki would provide a familiar
and rapid means to label quarantined edits. If Wikipedia hopes to maintain its open
nature these computational scoring engines must be embraced to further enable
platform functionality, not just external third party tools.
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7.2 Outstanding Vulnerabilities
Metrics regarding Wikipedia’s security performance only speak to the system’s han-
dling of status quo attackers. With our measurement studies finding näıve perpe-
trators plentiful these measures say little about the robustness of open collaboration
defense. In trying to identify system weaknesses we begin by describing and demon-
strating an aggressive spam attack model. The economic viability of our attempts
confirms the need for focus on several vulnerabilities. These complement discus-
sion regarding other system weaknesses gleaned from our community experience and
gamesmanship involving our tools. Ultimately these shortcomings speak to deeper
challenges and research questions in the domain of open collaboration.
A proof of concept attack: In our link spam measurement study of Sec. 4.1.2 we
were surprised to find a lack of aggressive spam strategies as are common in other
domains. This sparked curiosity as to whether Wikipedia’s damage response was
rendering these strategies economically ineffective. In a series of controversial exper-
iments [141] we engineered a payment disabled “male enhancement pharmacy” [86]
and prominently linked to that site on Wikipedia (Fig. 7.2). In less than 5 minutes
time we were able to post nearly 350 links that garnered 14,000 active views, 6,307
landing site visits, and 8 “purchases” for about $2000USD. The fallout was signifi-
cant enough to be reported by security media [150]. Crucially, under $20USD were
spent mounting these attacks. Core to our strategy were:
• Script driven editing: API based editing scripts rapidly placed links. The
rates at which this could occur were seemingly limited only by network latency.
• Popular artifacts: Wikipedia’s most popular articles (at the time of launch)
were targeted to maximize exposure [129]. As Tab. 6.1 and Tab. 6.2 show, only
several seconds of survival on such pages can permit many exposures.
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• Compiling human latency: With exposures compiling rapidly, defense la-
tency is critical. Our links survived 70 seconds at median, accounts were
blocked after 90 seconds, and domain blacklisting took place hours later.
• Privileged accounts: Page protection on popular articles requires regis-
tered and experienced accounts. We autonomously attained these by outsourc-
ing CAPTCHA solutions [100] and amassing edits in non-monitored spaces.
• Broad IP agility: Three accounts were used in our experiments, however,
many more were brought to privileged status. These were never correlated due
to our use of IPs from a large and geographically diverse cloud provider.
• Redundant human effort: Amazingly, 80% of landing site visits were
the result of users clicking through after the links had been reverted. This
speaks to a tremendous number of watchlisters reviewing the effected articles’
evolution in an ex post facto fashion.
Mitigation considerations: These proof-of-concept experiments do not intend to
make claims about the sustained performance of similar attacks but make apparent
Wikipedia’s immediate vulnerability. Some of these weaknesses make concrete our
earlier claims regarding signature driven detection, focus on popular pages, and the
need for efficient and coordinated human routing. Other vectors were leveraged
precisely because of the more fundamental challenges they pose.
Automated attack is one such challenge. Assuming an attacker evades computa-
tional filters the low/no marginal cost of script driven editing is problematic for a
human defense force. Increased barriers-to-entry are not a capable or cost effective
deterrent [100]. Rate limiting strategies might force attackers to operate at human-
like speed but still do not impact the labor imbalance. Similarly problematic are
broadly sourced attacks. In the worst case a botnet could be leveraged to achieve
massive IP agility, perhaps in parallel alongside a traditional (email) spam campaign.
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Wikipedia and partner operations (recall that most major wikis share an API) could
be significantly disrupted at rather low cost. Reinforcing this, Wikipedia’s most
prolific perpetrators [17] tend to not be characterized by technical novelty, but in-
stead by their ability to obtain many accounts. A massive pool of accounts could
be managed deceptively and disrupt ordinary defense processes (e.g., blanking user
warnings, flooding administrative spaces, burying damage in revision histories etc.).
It is interesting to consider why, if these vulnerabilities exist, they are not being
actively exploited. Blackhat software like XRumer [23, 120] already broadly targets
collaborative functionality. However, this appears optimized for Internet scale SEO
rather than targeted attacks against high value targets using wiki specific function-
ality. Perhaps these targeted environments lack the scale or expected profit margins
needed to incentivize capable attackers. This question remains one unanswered by
our research findings. Regardless, our approach has taken caution to inform relevant
parties of our findings [141]. It is worthwhile to consider that should someone go
to such lengths there is likely a desire to monetize their efforts. External hyperlink
additions are a minority of revisions yet the source of many security issues. More
scrutiny, focus, and restrictions surrounding their placement may be warranted along
with investigation into undermining their financial interests (e.g., domain registra-
tions were the most costly portion of our proof-of-concept attacks).
Other susceptibility: Orthogonal to aggressive spamming strategies are those
based on subtlety, a tactic not uncommon per our measurement study. One con-
cern is that intelligent attackers are carefully juxtapositioning their behaviors near
where the “damage” distinction is drawn. The more benign an edit appears to be
(regardless the underlying intention), the more likely it will survive on the encyclo-
pedia, even if this is only a product of social engineering. With humans handling
significant portions of damage and most of the “interesting” and borderline cases it
is worthwhile to consider the cognitive biases they might apply to the review task.
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For example, disguising small quantities of damage in large revision payloads might
be a fruitful tactic. Technical solutions should be explored to assist humans more
than the standard diff representation.
Collaborative security is also recursive notion. Just as our tools permit one to au-
dit changes to the encyclopedia, we have found ourselves auditing tool users’ actions
upon suspected misbehavior. In environments that are truly open and accessible
even the reviews need reviewed – and manipulation can pervade to the deepest lev-
els. While the threat of gamesmanship is omnipresent in open collaboration settings
the näıvety of the typical attacker and payload force one to question the necessity
of robust mechanisms. Consider our reputation calculations that only aggregate
feedback from trusted users and are not normalized due to ballot stuffing concerns.
There might be a net benefit in relaxing these constraints, even if such changes would
enable evasion by a narrow class of attackers.
This work has been particularly attentive to evasive and intelligent strategies, i.e.,
the automated attacks of this section and the “Generic Chinese Knockoff Spam” of
Sec. 4.1.2. We have identified features that capture properties of these isolated inci-
dents and our expectations about how hypothetical vulnerabilities might manifest.
Because such behaviors are sparse in our training sets these features tend not to
be leveraged during model construction. We author static rules to bring them into
force and have capability against unseen threats. While frustrating that näıve dam-
age obfuscates focus on the more subtle security properties of the platform, the fact
remains that open collaboration presents a broad attack plane. Dealing with this
breadth is a challenging defense problem in and of itself.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
In this dissertation we began by describing a class of systems characterized by “open
collaboration”: accessible platforms granting participants modification permissions
to support artifact cultivation. It is this ability to modify others’ content which
distinguishes these applications from simple collaboration (e.g., commenting func-
tionality, web forums) and results in a more dynamic security environment.
Using Wikipedia as a case study we observed this novelty gives rise to unique
damaging behaviors. First measuring vandalism, a catch-all of damage, we found of-
fensive, opinionated, narcissistic, and deceptive contributions common. Less “open”
environments would not consider many of these problematic given that their append
only models facilitate artistic expression and opinion sharing. Conversely, modifi-
cations over shared artifacts necessitate detailed policies to maintain social order
and define expected output. We find these guidelines often include expectations of
formality and correctness, with our survey revealing open collaboration commonly
supporting documentation and reference works. Consequently there is a broad set
of behaviors outside these policies which are considered damaging. In addition to
these novel social considerations, the technical semantics of modification actions also
present challenges. Revisions are not independent but build on the context of the
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artifact they modify. Content can be placed at arbitrary positions and significant im-
pact can be achieved with small payloads. Deletion and re-organization capabilities
provide avenues to make unconstructive changes without even adding content.
Much vandalism is immature, so by characterizing the link spam subset we sought
to learn how incentivized attackers were targeting the platform. Amassing the first
link spam corpus we found: (1) less than 10% of spammed sites had direct com-
mercial intentions, (2) spam is almost always context appropriate, (3) spammers
tended to follow linking conventions, and (4) links are manually placed in conser-
vative quantities. These are strategies intent on long term survival. Low barriers
to entry have enabled a fundamentally new class of attackers – in some cases un-
aware that they are even perpetrating damage – and in others content to perform
ambiguous self-promotion without sophisticated technical infrastructure.
These findings render related work from analogous domains insufficient for accu-
rate damage detection. Language techniques like Bayesian document classification
are easily evaded, cannot measure content veracity, and only accommodate content
additions. For spam, language model disagreement (i.e., out of context links) and
shared incentives (e.g., commercial intentions) were not exhibited by our corpus
but are security strategies common elsewhere. Due to this lack of existing compu-
tational solutions, a majority of damage on Wikipedia escapes autonomous filters.
This means its discovery becomes the responsibility of a distributed and disorganized
human workforce. Recognizing these shortcomings we sought to improve all aspects
of damage detection and mitigation for open collaboration.
Computational predictors of damage are helpful in both autonomous and human
mitigation strategies. We improved on existing language based methods with a
content agnostic approach built atop reputation and metadata features. While simple
reputation schemes had previously been described, we improved their scalability and
extended them spatially. Spatial extensions help overcome the generic “cold start”
problem, the fact sparse behavioral histories yield little predictive capability; one
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exacerbated by low barriers-to-entry and long tailed participation. For example,
the geolocation of a user holds tremendous predictive capability and we described
a model that could proportionally integrate this evidence along with user specific
feedback. We also uniquely applied these reputations to system artifacts (articles)
and the category spaces in which they are members.
While reputations leverage historical aggregation we also found extremely simple
metadata features indicative of damage. Features capturing adherence to community
conventions and disruption to typical content evolution have proven beneficial (“par-
ticipatory dynamics”). Cumulatively our work identified 25+ anti-damage features
and advanced performance benchmarks when these were brought to bear against a
standardized vandalism corpus (from 0.74 to 0.82 per “area under the curve” met-
rics). We also showed 40% of instances could be autonomously mitigated with tol-
erable false positives. Content agnostic features have also given models a robustness
and portability not present with language only approaches.
Extending our reputation/metadata approach to the link spam problem also
proved beneficial. In particular, Internet scale reputation based on backlinks was an
extremely indicative quantity. Assembling features into the first wiki specific anti-
spam classifier we found 70% of the problem space could be handled autonomously.
The atomicity of linking actions and the additional evidence they provide seem to en-
able the performance increases over anti-vandalism efforts. Regardless, it is content
agnostic features that drive performance in both cases. Not just useful for spam and
vandalism, we have made these signals portability explicit via cases studies spanning
damage types (copyright detection), natural language (foreign language Wikipedias),
and content format (source code repositories).
Even as computational methods mature, significant portions of the problem space
fall to human actors. To decrease redundant effort by this distributed workforce we
described organizational primitives such as edit locking and the explicit annotation
of non-damage. We also proposed using computational mechanisms to intelligently
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route participants towards potential damage, describing two schemes: (1) a purely
probabilistic one maximizing capture rate while minimizing incident survival and
(2) one combining this with article popularity to estimate expected impact. Given
that current open collaboration platforms (and Wikipedia in particular) lack this
organizational and routing functionality we independently developed a practical tool
that does (named “STiki”). The STiki tool has proven very popular, streamlining the
reversion of over 350,000 English Wikipedia edits en route to 1.1+ million reviews.
We used this massive set to learn more about human factors in the mitigation
process, focusing predominately on “patrollers” who form the first line of defenses by
reviewing recent changes en masse. We found such users spend only about 6 seconds
per edit, are uninterested in performing more time consuming and ambiguous spam
reviews, and abandon the tool when revert rates fall below 20%. We attribute
portions of this to a user base that correlates personal reputation to the number
of editing actions a user performs. Long term participation trends show rapid user
turnover. Those who do not quit Wikipedia altogether move on to alternative (and
arguably more fulfilling) roles. Damage patrol is rote work, and in Wikipedia’s case,
one being taken on by a declining number of users even as end user traffic continues to
grow. Though experiments in the STiki tool showed gamification could be leveraged
to increase review throughput, the trend persists broadly. These patterns make clear
the need for our proposed routing and organizational strategies in order to better
scale the human assets available.
Cumulatively our impacts on Wikipedia’s practical security are undeniable. Our
contributions are already – or in the process of – being integrated into an infrastruc-
ture that reverts 75% of damage before it is likely consumed by a single end user.
While we can identify areas for improvement and potential vulnerabilities, this is
nonetheless a tremendous technical and social achievement for a purely volunteer
effort that protects 4+ million artifacts. However, as the prototypical open collab-
oration application Wikipedia’s lessons also cascade to the entire class of systems.
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Our content agnostic approaches have sought to embrace this generality. For open
collaboration to succeed it must allow installations to embrace collaborative benefits
that exceed the security burdens that modification freedoms impose. This demands
not only the technical capability to detect damage but the practical integration that
makes this functionality available. Our efforts herein have sought to advance both
aspects, enabling the expansion of open collaboration philosophies, and laying the
foundation towards more nuanced quality assessments.
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